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"All the stockholders act like a flock of sheep."'
"We put a man on the moon,
but we can 't manage the consequences of
2
shareholder democracy.",

. Introduction
On March 31, 2006, just as the spring annual meeting season began, The
Corporate Library released a study of eleven of the largest U.S. companies
revealing that "compensation committees authorized a total of $865 million in
pay to CEOs who presided over an aggregate loss of $640 billion in shareholder
value., 3 Around the country, corporate directors and executives felt, some for
the first time, the wrath of organized, discontented shareholders who demanded
more say about director elections and executive compensation. In the annual
meetings that followed, shareholders considered proposals to limit or, at the
least, monitor directors' and executives' compensation, as well as proposals to
permit shareholders to withhold votes from directors (especially those serving
on compensation committees) as a means of requiring them to resign. In some
companies, shareholders were even asked to vote on proposals that would
require a director to gain a majority of "yes" votes to be elected.4 As one
commentator put it: "There is a whiff of revolution in the air. America's
shareholders are growing restless, and the bosses of the companies they own
seem increasingly
nervous as they peer out from behind their boardroom
5
curtains."

1. Robert F. Herrick (cited in

WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET

96

(1927)).
2. Gretchen Morgenson, Who's Afraidof ShareholderDemocracy?,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2005, § 3, at 1.
3. Press Release, The Corporate Library, $865MM in CEO Compensation While
Shareholders Suffer $640BN in Losses (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.thecorporatelibrary.
com/tcl-store/PressReleases/865mm in ceo compensationwhile.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. Gretchen Morgenson, The ShareholderSpring: Investor Discontent Fills Annual
Meeting Agendas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2006, at Cl. Currently, in most corporations, a
candidate only has to win more votes than any other candidate. Hence a candidate can be
elected with only one "yes" vote if the remaining votes are withheld. See Dennis K. Berman,
BoardroomDefenestration-AsProxy Season Heats Up, Companies ConsiderRules to Boot
Unwanted Directors,WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2006, at B I (discussing a potential shift toward
majority voting in director elections).
5. Ownership Matters; ShareholderDemocracy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2006, at 10.
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Some might celebrate this new (or renewed) shareholder activism as an
important milestone in empowering shareholders to negotiate corporate
governance structures that would benefit them and other investors.6 Others
might caution against giving shareholders too much power.7 And many will
agree that despite these developments, there is no reason to believe that the way
corporations, their directors, or their executives behave would dramatically
change in the absence of financial incentives that require them to do so.8 In this
respect, a pointed comment in The Economist a couple of years ago rings true:
"America is the world's most prominent democracy, and its most successful
exponent of shareholder capitalism. But when it comes to shareholder
democracy, America has barely moved beyond the corporate equivalent of the
rotten borough." 9 In this Article I turn to history to explore why.
I should emphasize at the start that I do not attempt to evaluate whether
the active participation of shareholders will improve how corporations are run.
Nor do I engage in the debate as to whether shareholder democracy is a useful
concept in characterizing the relationship between shareholders, their directors,

6. See, e.g., Press Release, Harvard Law School, AIG,Bristol-Myers and Time-Warner
amended bylaws in response to Bebchuk's proposals, Apr. 5, 2006, http://www.
law.harvard.edu/news/2006/04/05_bebchuk.php (discussing binding bylaw provisions adopted
by these companies to limit board power with respect to poison pills, to reimburse shareholders
for expenses incurred in conjunction with a shareholder proposal that won a majority of the
votes, and to allow shareholders to withhold their votes as a means of requiring directors to
resign) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HAv. L. REv. 1735 (2006) (arguing that the separation of ownership
from control offers important efficiency benefits which justify limited shareholder participation,
at least as a default rule); Lynn Stout, The Mythical Benefits ofShareholderControl,93 VA. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
-929530 (arguing that board control offers shareholders in public corporations important
economic benefits that shareholder control does not).
8. OwnershipMatters,supra note 5, at 10; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Can't Take It
Anymore?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006, § 3, at 1 (reporting on the re-election of Pfizer's
directors); Joe Nocera, The Board Wore Chicken Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2006, at Cl
(reporting on the annual meeting of Home Depot and concluding that "[i]f there is one thing the
meeting proved, it is that [the directors] don't much care what their shareholders think"); Chad
Terhune & Joann S. Lublin, At Home Depot, CEO 'PayRage 'Boils over in Vote, WALL ST. J.,
June 2, 2006, at A3 (reporting that although 30% of the shareholders' votes were withheld from
ten of the eleven directors of Home Depot, these directors didn't plan to step down); Jeffrey
Ball, Exxon Holders Defy Management with Resolution, WALL ST. J., June 1, 2006, at AI0
(reporting that even though Exxon Mobil's shareholders approved a management-opposed
resolution requiring a majority rather than a plurality vote for board member elections, the
board's response was to take the resolution under advisement).
9. No Democracy Please, We're Shareholders: American Corporate Governance,
ECONOMIST, May 1, 2004, at 13.
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and their corporations. My goal is limited to exploring the historical roots of
current discussions about the shareholders' role in publicly held corporations.
Proponents of shareholder democracy might want to fault those who
caution against it for the fact that meaningful shareholder participation in
corporate affairs, independent of financial incentives, seems to remain out of
our reach. But, as I argue, the reality of the shareholder's role in public
corporations is a product of a broader phenomenon-a century-long suspicion
of the individual shareholder-participant and a corresponding ambivalence
toward shareholder (participatory) democracy. History shows that attempts that
appeared to foster shareholder democracy, independent of financial demands,
were never really about promoting the shareholders' active involvement in
managing the affairs of their corporations. Rather, reformers used the rhetoric
of shareholder democracy to promote broader goals and visions. In the process,
they gradually made shareholder (participatory) democracy much talk about,
well, nothing.
Currently, the ability of shareholders to affect corporate change is limited.
First, the individual vote in large public corporations makes little if any
difference. At least in part, this is why most shareholders vote for what the
incumbent board wants (or why most proxy solicitations by the board are
successful). Institutional investors might have more voting power (and, indeed,
many of the above-mentioned proposals are promoted by pension funds)' 0 but,
ultimately, these institutions also have more to lose by pushing too hard,
especially in terms of their ongoing relationships with corporate management.'1
10. The idea that institutional investors would monitor management was prevalent during
the 1990s. For an analysis of these investors' ability to do so, see, e.g., Bernard S. Black,
Agents WatchingAgents: The Promiseof InstitutionalInvestor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV.811
(1992).
11. For example, Gretchen Morgenson notes that:
[D]ata for the 12 months ended June 30 show that Fidelity... sided with corporate
management and directors in 92.5 percent of its votes and supported 99 percent of
the directors whom management nominated. On shareholder proposals intended to
give investors more say in board elections or to limit executive or director pay,
Fidelity repeatedly voted "no."
Gretchen Morgenson, Fidelity,Staunch Defender ofthe Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006,
§ 3, at 1; see also Gretchen Morgenson, How to Finda Fund's True Colors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
10, 2006, § 3, at 1 (examining funds' votes to determine whether they were motivated by
shareholders' interests or their own). But see Gretchen Morgenson, BelatedApologies in Proxy
Land, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2006, § 3, at 1 (reporting on the Putnam Funds' campaign to
change corporate governance by emphasizing "director independence, executive compensation,
and shareholder proposals that have been approved by a majority of owners but have still not
been put into effect by companies"). According to Morgenson, Putnam Funds "opposed
directors in 16 percent of elections and voted against 64 percent of proposals by these
companies to adopt or amend stock option or restricted stock plans for company executives or
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Hedge fund activism is similarly dubious. 12
A shareholder seeking to challenge the actions of her corporation's
management (by which I mean directors and executives) may engage in a proxy
contest, and, if successful, be able to upset management's plans, perhaps even
oust the board. But this is rare. The board almost always dominates the proxy
process. First, the only votes that count are those cast in favor of the names on
the proxy, which usually are proposed by management. Furthermore,
management often proposes only one candidate for each open board seat.
Finally, 60% of American firms have a staggered board, which means that only
one-third of board seats are up for election each year. A shareholder could still
submit her own proxy "carrying a rival slate of candidates." But unlike
management, which has the right to use corporate funds to promote its slate, the
dissident shareholder has to incur the cost of the proxy contest. This can
amount 13to several million dollars. Not surprisingly, proxy contests rarely
happen.

directors." Id.
12. In a recent study of hedge fund activism, William Bratton concludes that this new
form of shareholder activism has the potential to change "the balance of power between
managers and shareholders," especially through the usage of the proxy system. William W.
Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, Georgetown Law & Econ. Research Paper,
availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-_id=928689. Yet, as Bratton also
notes, hedge funds, like institutional investors in the 1990s, act only when there are financial
incentives to do so. Id. at 7. As Bratton puts it, their activism is "benign" and in many cases,
"[a]ctivists have joined many target board of directors, modifying their tactics in so doing." Id.
at 6; see also Jesse Eisinger, Hedge-FundActivism Wins Plaudits,But the Focus Is Really on
Firms' Cash, WALL ST.J., Oct. 12, 2005, at CI (noting that "[t]he problem with the new wave
of hedge-fund activism is that it is, for the most part, friendly and modest. Hedgies are
notorious for being short-term thinkers; the question is whether they will follow through on
their activism in the face of resistance").
13. No DemocracyPlease,supranote 9, at 13; see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case
for ShareholderAccess: A Response to the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 557,
559 (2005) (noting that "in the seven-year period 1996-2002... 215 contested proxy
solicitations took place, about 30 per year on average"). According to Bebchuk:
The majority of the contested solicitations... did not involve attempts to replace
the board with a new team that would run the firm differently. About a quarter of
the contests did not involve director elections at all, but concerned other matters
such as proposed bylaw amendments. Among contests over the election of
directors, a majority involved a fight over a possible sale of the company or over a
possible opening or restructuring of a closed-end fund. Contests over the team that
would run the (stand-alone) firm in the future occurred in about 80 companies,
among the thousands that are publicly traded, during the seven-year period 19962002.
Furthermore, most of the firms in which such contests occurred were small. Of the
firms in which such contests occurred, only 10 firms had, in the year of the
contested solicitation, a market capitalization exceeding $200 million. Thus, the
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While an individual shareholder might demand that management include a
shareholder proposal along with its proxy solicitation under Rule 14a-8 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the courts have limited the permissible scope of shareholder
proposals. Most important, a board can refuse to include a proposal dealing
with "ordinary business" activity. In any event, a shareholder proposal that is
included and approved typically has no binding force. It1 4is legally nothing
more than advice to the board, and the board can ignore it.
Shareholders' voting power would increase if boards of directors were to
adopt charter provisions allowing shareholders to force the resignation of any
board member by withholding their votes. It would also increase if
corporations adopt a majority vote rule, 5 or if shareholders are allowed to
introduce shareholder proposals to demand shareholder access proposals in
their bylaws. (Shareholders access proposals would permit shareholders
to
6
nominate their own candidates for the board in certain circumstances.)
incidence of such contests for firms with a market capitalization exceeding $200
million was remarkably low-less than two per year on average.
Id.
14. See No DemocracyPlease, supra note 9, at 13 (noting that shareholder resolutions
generally do not bind corporate boards).
15. On January 17, 2006, the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Business
Law of the American Bar Association released a preliminary report detailing possible
amendments to the Modem Business Corporation Act. These amendments would allow either
the board of directors or the shareholders unilaterally to amend their corporation's bylaws to
require majority voting. This change would "have the effect of not seating, for more than a 90day transitional period, a director whose election or re-election has effectively been rejected by a
majority of votes cast." Press Release, Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of
Business Law of the American Bar Association, Corporate Law Committee Releases
Preliminary Report on Director Voting (Jan. 17, 2006), http://www.abanet.org/
buslaw/committees/CL270000pub/directorvoting/20060117000001.pdf. Pfizer, Inc., Microsoft
Corp., Gannet Co. and Safeway Inc. have already amended their election guidelines, so that
"any director who receives more 'withhold' votes than 'for' votes must submit his or her
resignation." Phyllis Plitch, Critics Fault Changes to Board Votes-CorporateDemocracy
Move Draws Fireas Smoke Screen; Timefor Majority Standard?,WALL ST. J., Nov. 29,2005,
at B8. It is important to remember, however, that the board "can reject a resignation and retain
an unpopular director." Gretchen Morgenson, Finally, ShareholdersStartActing Like Owners,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, § 3, at 1. As Morgenson also notes,
[P]roposals that would require directors to win more than half of the shareholders'
vote to gain a board seat have appeared at 140 companies this year. At companies
including Bank of America, the Borders Group, the EMC Corporation,
International Paper, Raytheon and Verizon, more than half of the votes cast
supported such proposals.
Id.
16. In September 2006, a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit altered a long-standing SEC policy allowing companies to exclude shareholder
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Yet, as I argue in this Article, none of these mechanisms is likely to
change the century-long suspicion of the individual shareholder-participant and
the corresponding empty rhetoric about shareholder democracy that helped
bring, shape, and sustain today's reality. This Article explores this suspicion
and rhetoric as they are seen in conversations about the shareholder's role in the
modem public corporation from the beginning of the twentieth century roughly
through the 1980s. It examines how these conversations shifted from the group
to the individual to the market as the basis for analysis, gradually eliminating
the possibility of meaningful shareholder participation in corporate affairs.
While the Article does not engage more recent debates, it offers important
historical grounding for them.
As this Article demonstrates, corporate scholars have embraced two
competing conceptions of the shareholder's role in the corporation: one
focuses on the role of shareholders as investors, the other emphasizes the role
of shareholders as potential participants in corporate management. 7 These
visions are not mutually exclusive. Yet scholars throughout the twentieth
century developed different conceptions of shareholder democracy by
prioritizing one vision over the other.
Scholars who viewed shareholders as investors typically argued that the
role of law was to guarantee that shareholders had adequate information to
participate intelligently in the market for securities. In turn, scholars who
proposals having to do with director elections. Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees,
Employees Pension Plan v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2006). The court
upheld that the SEC rule applied only to proposals having to do with particular elections and not
to proposals seeking to establish "procedural rules for governing elections generally." Id at
131. The court required the American International Group to bring to a shareholder vote a
proposal, submitted by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees'
pension plan, to amend the corporation's bylaws to include a shareholder access proposal. The
shareholder access proposal would allow a shareholder who has owned "at least 3 percent of the
company's stock for a year to nominate directors to appear on the company's proxy as
alternatives to the candidates nominated by the existing board." Floyd Norris, Court Decision
PromptsS.E. C.to Revisit a Rule on ShareholderProposals,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,2006, § C, at
5; see also Gretchen Morgenson, All's Not Lost, DisgruntledInvestors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2006, § 3, at 1 (reporting that the SEC might revise Rule 14a-8 to circumvent the Second
Circuit's ruling); Gretchen Morgenson, FreshAirfor BoardElections?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
2006, § 3, at 1 (reporting that the SEC postponed discussion of the shareholder access
proposals, thus leaving the Second Circuit's ruling standing).
17. Some scholars collapse this dichotomy. See, e.g., Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8,
InstitutionalShareholderProposals,and CorporateDemocracy, 23 GA. L. Rnv. 97, 104-05
(1988-89) (observing that "shareholder voting constitutes the investor voice in managing
corporate affairs"); Jennifer Hill, Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder,48 Am. J. COMP. L.
39, 78 (2000) (describing the traditional view of shareholders as marginalized owners as a "onedimensional model of the past" while suggesting expanded roles for shareholders in modem
corporations).
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envisioned shareholders as participants in management sought to empower or
protect them by making changes to the corporation's internal structure. As
should be apparent, these two conceptions of the shareholder's role
corresponded to two basic models of regulating corporations: regulation of the
market for securities and regulation of the corporation's internal structure.
The idea of shareholders as investors limited the location of shareholder
democracy to the market. Scholars who viewed shareholders this way focused
on mandatory disclosure rules as the means of achieving shareholder
democracy. At times they argued that disclosure would provide government
agencies with information which they could use to constrain corporate power.
At other times, they described shareholders as regulators and claimed that
disclosure would provide shareholders with information, which they could use
in determining where to invest. At still other times, they proclaimed that
shareholders could receive information from others on the market. Throughout
the twentieth century, these scholars' basic premise remained the same: The
shareholder's role in the large public corporation was limited to her decision to
invest or divest.
But scholars and reformers who argued that shareholders should have a
more active role in corporate management were also reluctant to give
shareholders meaningful access to the corporate decision-making processes.
They were afraid that shareholders were too passive to participate in corporate
management and, more significantly, that they could not be trusted to make the
correct decisions. For the most part, they ended up using the rhetoric of
shareholder democracy (and the shareholders) as a proxy for achieving other
goals. In the course of the twentieth century, as their attention shifted from the
group to the individual to the market as the foundation for legal and political
analysis, these scholars also changed their goals from taming the power of the
control group to constraining management to legitimating managerial power.
More important, because they refused truly to empower shareholders, these
scholars' attempts presumably to promote shareholder democracy ultimately
drained the idea of any content. By the end of the twentieth century, the
participant shareholder was the investor shareholder.
This Article is divided into three parts. The first Part, Disclosure,
Organization, and Trust, begins the story of shareholder democracy by
examining debates about the modem corporation in the first two decades of the
twentieth century. I argue that during this era, corporate scholars' dominant
frame of reference was the increasing power of the large public corporation.
While scholars in the 1900s and 1910s expressed concern about the
disappearance of the individual investor in the large public corporation, they
were more worried about the growth of trusts. Seeking either to eliminate
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monopolies or to subject them to national regulation, these early-twentiethcentury scholars converged on disclosure, either to local or national authorities,
as a means of guaranteeing the prosperity of modem economic markets.
By the 1920s, as growing numbers of investors flooded the market,
scholars grew more concerned about potential abuses of corporate power and
how the rapid separation of ownership from control augmented these potential
abuses. At the same time, they also wanted to legitimate the large public
corporation and the power of management to run it. As a means of mediating
these seemingly conflicting ends, the 1920s reformers emphasized the role that
minority shareholders as a group could play in preventing the control group
from dominating the corporate decision-making process. (As we will see, in
the early twentieth century, the control group was often another group of
shareholders or investment bankers, not necessarily corporate management.) 18
If their 1910s predecessors called for mandatory disclosure rules, the 1920s
reformers called for minority shareholder organization.
Prominent legal scholars and economists like Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and
William Z. Ripley advocated the creation of minority shareholders' protective
organizations. Their vision grew out of a new vision of the American state as
composed of multiple countervailing powers. They appeared to take their cue
from the contemporaneous efforts to empower workers through collective
bargaining and from the collective economic power represented by the
corporation itself. But, as will become apparent, their interest focused on
imposing checks and balances on the power of the control group, be it
investment banks, controlling shareholders, or management, not on giving
shareholders meaningful voice in corporate management. When forced to
choose between trusting shareholders as active agents to tame corporate power
and using the goal of protecting shareholders to constrain the exercise of
corporate power by those in control, these scholars chose the latter.
Ambivalent about granting minority shareholders real power to influence their
corporations' affairs, these reformers substituted a regime of fiduciary duties
for shareholder organization. The first attempt to give meaningful voice to
shareholders ended with protection but not empowerment.

18.

The present equation of the control group with management is a product of the post-

New Deal corporation and a very different structure of share ownership that has characterized
American corporations in the second half of the twentieth century. This equation has helped
sustain the agency paradigm of corporate law, which has dominated discussions of corporate
law in the last decades of the twentieth century. On the economic and legal definitions of

control, see Gardiner C. Means, The Separation of Ownership and Control in American
Industry, 46 Q. J. EcoN. 68 (1931).
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The second Part of this Article, Consumerism, Democracy, and Its Limits,
demonstrates how the crash of 1929 and the following Depression shifted
scholars' and reformers' attention from the corporation back to the market.
Amid investigations of fraud and manipulation that contributed to the 1929
crash, revelations of corruption that permeated the securities market eclipsed
earlier concerns about corporate power. The securities acts of 1933 and 1934
did not try to empower or protect shareholders. Their goal was to reinforce the
ideal of a healthy free market. Accordingly, the government's role was limited
to ensuring the free flow of honest information. Seeking to restore investors'
trust, the securities acts (unlike other early-New Deal legislation) were not
predicated upon the need for government planning, but on the ideal of
consumerism. As long as individual shareholders, like individual consumers in
general, were fully informed about their product, they would be able to make
intelligent decisions about their securities purchases. As long as individual
shareholders had access to internal corporate information, they would help free
the market from fraud and manipulation.
The vision of the shareholder as participant did not disappear. In the mid1930s, William 0. Douglas reiterated Berle's and Ripley's ideas (and E.
Merrick Dodd endorsed them), and in the early-1940s, the SEC adopted Rule
14a-8 to give shareholders the participatory role state law effectively denied
them in managing the affairs of their corporations. By requiring the board to
include shareholder proposals in its proxy solicitations, reformers wanted to
protect the rights of individual shareholders to share with others their ideas
about the corporation's goals.
However, this new participatory role was no longer a collective role.
Amid fears of creeping totalitarianism (and later communism), these 1940s
reformers turned away from the collectivism of earlier generations and instead
embraced the ideal of individual rights as the cornerstone of American and
corporate democracy. They wanted to guarantee that both political and
economic markets were committed to protecting individual rights and to
encouraging dialogue between the rulers and the ruled. As share ownership
became widely dispersed and professional management replaced bankers and
controlling shareholders as the control group, concerns about corporate power
in society and about the power of the control group toward minority
shareholders were replaced by concerns about the relationship between
management and individual shareholders. Yet, by protecting the rights of
individual shareholders to participate in their corporation's annual meetings,
the New Deal reformers and their successors hoped not only to constrain the
board but also to legitimate its power to run the corporation. More broadly,
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they hoped to create an individualist basis for a democracy founded on
professional management of collective property.
The 1940s reformers believed that corporations could play an important
role in sustaining the ideal of American political democracy. Yet they
remained ambivalent about granting power to shareholders; they limited
shareholder participation to "proper subjects," leaving an open door for
restrictive interpretations of this term. In the following decades, as the idea that
the state and its agencies should protect individual shareholders lost its power,
together with the ideal of a social welfare state that sustained it, such
interpretations helped minimize the shareholders' power. Gradually the SEC,
with the courts' approval, used Rule 14a-8 to help legitimate a rather limited
vision of shareholder democracy. It was predicated upon the ability of the
individual shareholder to protect herself by electing directors who would,
presumably, act as her agents. The rise of institutional investors helped sustain
this assumption.
The focal point for analysis in the 1970s and 1980s was the market.
Mainstream legal scholars and economists came to believe that the market was
the most effective institution to constrain corporate activities. If policymakers
and legal scholars in the early twentieth century focused on minority
shareholders as a group, and mid-century reformers wanted to protect the
individual shareholder's right of participation, scholars in the latter part of the
twentieth century emphasized the ability of individual shareholders freely to
shape their own economic (and political) destinies (albeit in a corporate world
radically dominated by institutional investors). Concerns about corporate
social, economic, and political power or about managerial abuse of power
dissipated; the corporation and, with it, corporate hierarchies, disappeared.
As the third Part, Markets, Voters, and Convergence, explores, the
argument that shareholders can self-protect underlay the economic theory of the
firm, which dominated corporate law in the 1970s and 1980s. Endorsing a
strong separation between the roles of shareholders and those in control,
proponents of this vision argued that dissatisfied shareholders should either use
their voting power or sell their stock. Just as insider professional management
became more powerful and the board of directors lost its control, scholars
turned to the rhetoric of the law of agency to describe directors as agents of the
shareholders and to emphasize the shareholders' power to elect them. All that
was left of the shareholder's role in the corporation was her ability to vote or
exit, based upon the assumption that when fully informed investors rationally
exercised their rights, the market would thrive. At the same time, procedural
equality became the cornerstone of American democracy.
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The hostile takeovers of the 1980s might have undermined the strength of
these scholars' convictions, but it did not alter the basic premise: Shareholder
democracy thrived in the market. The vision of the shareholder as participant
has converged with the vision of the shareholder as investor. In either role, the
shareholder's only goal was to maximize her profits. The shareholders'
potential power to exit and vote legitimated the insiders' real market power.
The rhetoric of democracy became an apology for the status quo.
On this background, recent calls to give shareholders more meaningful
voice in the selection and removal of directors seem to resonate with earlier
attempts to foster shareholder democracy. In an intellectual milieu that
developed out of the idea that the market was the locus of shareholder
democracy, some recent board decisions that allow shareholders to force the
resignation of board members by withholding their votes and the shareholder
proxy access proposal can easily be described as empowering investors,
especially institutional investors.
But these recent efforts are more limited than the earlier attempts
described in this Article. Gone is the Progressives' concern with corporate
power in society and with it the assumption that minority shareholders could
help channel corporate actions to achieve socially beneficial goals. Gone is the
New Dealers' concern about hierarchy within corporations and with it the
assumption that the individual shareholder should be guaranteed a right of
participation. Gone also is the concern about the shareholder's willingness or
ability to tame corporations and their managements. All that remains of the
ideal of shareholder democracy is the power of shareholders to elect their
directors, directors who might have little say in how executives run the
corporation, and to exit if they cannot. The participating shareholder is the
investor shareholder. If her share price does not soar, she can try to oust the
board or sell her stock. Corporations are run as "rotten boroughs"' 9 because, in
the course of the twentieth century, the ambivalence about shareholder
democracy has wiped out all other alternatives.
II. 1900s-1930s: Disclosure,Organization,and Trust
A. DisclosurePartI: Regulating Monopolies
The turn of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic growth in the scale
of private business organizations. Increasing consumer demand, rising
numbers of skilled and unskilled workers, and an expanding pool of capital
19.

No Democracy Please,supra note 9, at 13.
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made the creation of large enterprises possible, while corporate lawyers created
a variety of legal devices to help their clients increase the scope of their
operations through "cooperation and combinations." 20 Trusts, holding
companies, and mergers became common, even if often contested in state
courts. 2 1 The nineteenth-century corporation, which was subject to strict
constraints on its powers as well as limitations on its capital structure, was
replaced by larger and larger units. Between 1888 and 1893, New Jersey
revised its general incorporation statute to eliminate restrictions on
"capitalization and assets, mergers and consolidations, the issuance of voting
stock, the purpose(s) of incorporation, and the duration and locale of
business. 2 2 Other states followed suit, enacting more enabling incorporation
statutes (including Delaware, which by the second decade of the twentieth
century would become the revolution's leader).23 And corporations were quick
to use the power that these enabling statutes granted them. Between 1898 and
as a result of merger, and merger capitalization
1901, "2,274 firms disappeared
24
totaled $5.4 billion.
The concentration of power in the trusts and large business corporations
undermined nineteenth-century democratic ideals. Progressives feared that
corporations were wearing away the function of the individual producer and,
with it, the nineteenth-century democratic and economic ideals. These ideals
were the power of markets equally to "distribute the rewards of individual
industry" and to help "conform individual liberty" to socially beneficial ends.25
For some scholars, individual ownership of property and participation in the
market economy were a means of cultivating social and political citizenship.
They saw in the corporation's collective ownership a threat to the idea of
"ordinary producers," who "shape their world on equal footing. 2 6 For others,
private property was a means of constraining the exercise of public power.
20. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 130-31 (William W. Fisher, III, Morton J. Horwitz &
Thomas A. Reed eds., 1993).
21. See id. at 131 (tracing the development of corporate ownership structures and
corresponding government regulations); see also ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE
CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG
BUSINESS 7 (1998) (noting the proliferation of corporate mergers between 1895 and 1904).
22. ScoTr R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT:
LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 60 (1996).

23.
24.

Id.
Melvin I. Urofsky, ProposedFederalIncorporationin the ProgressiveEra,26 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 160, 161 (1982).
25. L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline ofDevelopmental Property,
82 Nw. U. L. REv. 596, 618 (1988).
26. Id. at 619.
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They saw in the concentration of power in a few corporations a threat to
individual autonomy.
Giant corporations obfuscated "the traditional
relationships between individual liberty, competition and social utility," and
made impossible assessment of the national wealth based on aggregations of
individual valuations.27
Seeking to sustain the nineteenth-century ideals of civic engagement in the
twentieth-century organizational society-to reconstitute the American
democratic ideal-and to add organization, stability, and reason to what seemed
to be the chaotic nature of industrial capitalism, Progressives focused their
attention on the growing trusts. 28 Some reformers emphasized the need to
control business units locally in order to encourage civic participation and tame
corporate power. Others wanted to subject large corporations to national
regulation.29 Interestingly, while endorsing two presumably opposing
positions-decentralization and centralization of power, respectivelyProgressive scholars seemed to converge on mandatory disclosure as the
ultimate means of regulating corporate power.
Proponents of centralization viewed large business units (and an economy
of scale) as inevitable and sought to subject them to national control. While the
Sherman Act attempted to regulate trusts, the main attempt to involve the
federal government in corporate regulation was the federal incorporation
movement of the first decade of the twentieth century. It called for federal
licensing of state-chartered corporations that engaged in interstate commerce, or
alternatively federal chartering of all corporations engaged in interstate
commerce. 30 As President Theodore Roosevelt put it in his message to
Congress on December 3, 1901, "In the interest of the whole people.., the
Nation should, without interfering with the power of States in the matter itself,
also assume power of supervision and regulation over all corporations doing an
interstate business." 3 1 Roosevelt did not want to do away with big business, but
rather to find ways, through national supervision and regulation, to encourage
the growth of good trusts while constraining the power (or eliminating) bad
trusts.

32

27. Id. See generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, THE SPECULATION ECONOMY: How
FINANCE TRIUMPHED OVER INDUSTRY ch. 4 (forthcoming 2007) (on file with the author).
28. On Progressive ideology, see RICHARD H. PELLS, RADICAL VISIONS AND AMERICAN
DREAMS: CULTURE AND SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE DEPRESSION YEARS 3 (1998).
29. On the positions of decentralization and centralization, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 211-21 (1996).
30. Urofsky, supra note 24, at 160-70.
31. Id. at 168.
32. Id. at 168-70.
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Even though none of the numerous bills introduced in Congress between
1900 and 1914 to enact some form of federal incorporation or licensing law
matured into law, the idea of federal incorporation received the support of
business leaders. For instance, "George W. Perkins of the House of Morgan,
railroad magnate James J. Hill, and Elbert H. Gary of U.S. Steel" endorsed the
proposal discussed in a 1904 report of the Bureau ofCorporations.33 So did the
Wall Street Journal and Manufacturers' News.34 Their support revealed the
limits of the proposal. While all corporations engaged in interstate commerce
would have to secure a federal license (or charter), to do so they had to meet
only minimal criteria regarding organization, capitalization, and disclosure.
Seeking to fight monopolies (or bad trusts), proponents of federal incorporation
put their faith in mandatory disclosure. While the Bureau of Corporations
would not have the power to mandate certain behavior, proponents of federal
incorporation believed that by requiring corporations to publicize their finances
represented
and activities, the Bureau could ensure that "corporations
35
themselves honestly and ...[abided] by federal rules."
Despite their concerns about the disappearance of the individual producer,
proponents of centralization accepted the dominant view of their time, that is,
that shareholders were investors, not proprietors.36 Moreover, they treated
shareholders-the investors-as a homogeneous group, and did not pay much
attention to potential conflicts of interest among shareholders (specifically,
among controlling and minority shareholders). Perhaps because they were
mostly concerned about the growth of trusts, the centralizers did not focus on
intra-corporate relations, but rather on ways to prevent or regulate monopolies.
They assumed that by imposing mandatory disclosure rules on corporations

33. Id. at 175.
34. Id. Congress established the Bureau of Corporations in 1903 "to investigate further
the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' businesses." Id.at 169.
35. Urofsky, supra note 24, at 177, 170-82; see also Philip A. Loomis, Jr. & Beverly K.
Rubman, Corporate Governance in HistoricalPerspective, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 141, 158-61
(1979-1980) (examining early twentieth century proposals for federal incorporation or
licensing); Horace L. Wilgus, A ProposedNationalIncorporationLaw, 2 MICH. L. REv. 501
(1904) (discussing the need for a federal incorporation law to "promote the general welfare"). It
is important to note that publicity in this context meant disclosure to the Department of
Commerce and the President, not to the investor. MITCHELL, supra note 27, at ch. 6.
36.

See, e.g., MoRToNJ. HoRWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OFAMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:

THE CISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 93 (1992) (arguing that "[b]y the time of the First World War,
it was common for legal writers to observe that... 'stockholders today are primarily investors
and not proprietors"') (quoting J.T. CARTER, THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION AS A LEGAL
ENTITY 160 (1919)).
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(through local or national agencies), they would protect the market from the
37
threat of monopoly; the protection of investors was not their main concern.
Disclosure as a means of regulating monopoly was also the solution
proposed by proponents of decentralization, as reflected in the writing of Louis
Brandeis. According to Brandeis, large business units undermined democratic
institutions and eroded "the moral and civic capacities that equip workers to
think and act as citizens. 38 Because he was concerned about political as well
as economic concentration of power, Brandeis did not want "to confront big
business with big government." 39 Rather, he wanted to encourage competition
by protecting small businesses from "the predatory practices of monopolies and
national chains. 4 0 In this vein, Brandeis urged more effective enforcement of
the Sherman Act and proposed banning such practices as interlocking
directorates and investment bankers acting as middlemen in corporate
41
transactions (in direct conflict with their role as trustees for investors).
Yet the most important element of Brandeis's position was disclosure. He
believed that the acquisition of information "concerning the great monopolistic
trusts" would allow lawmakers and policymakers to create intelligent solutions
to the problem of trusts.42 Moreover, he recognized the importance ofpublicity
as a tool of regulating manipulative practices. "Compel bankers when issuing
securities to make public the commissions or profits they are receiving, '4 3 and
44
require, also, "a disclosure of all participants in an underwriting," he wrote.
Brandeis hoped that those involved in predatory practices would stop them
once they were required to report them. But his disclosure solution was also
meant to solve a different problem-the problem of control. As we will see in
the next section, by the second decade of the twentieth century, Progressives
became concerned not only about the growth of trusts, but also about the
growing separation of ownership from control in large business units. The
realization that the power of giant corporations was controlled by a relatively
small number of prominent investors exacerbated Progressives' fears about
monopoly. "The goose that lays golden eggs has been considered a most
37.
38.
39.

MITCHELL, supra note 27, at ch. 5.

SANDEL, supra note 29, at 211.
Id. at 212.

40. Id.
41. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND How THE BANKERS USE IT61-62,
81, 109, 199-200 (1914).
42. THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCEUANEouS PAPERS OF Louis D. BRANDEIS 135-36, 12937 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934).

43.
44.

BRANDEIS, supra note 41, at 101.
Id. at 105.
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valuable possession," Brandeis wrote. "But even more profitable is the
' 45
privilege of taking the golden eggs laid by somebody else's goose.
According to Brandeis, by controlling other people's money, investment
bankers and their associates "control[led] the people through the people's own
money."46 As he saw it, control of aggregate wealth threatened political and
individual liberty.47
Brandeis went further. If disclosure was a means of regulating predatory
practices that led to the creation of trusts, Brandeis wanted investors to act as
regulators. He believed that in their investment decisions and in their selection
of directors, investors could regulate corporate actions.48 To be able to fulfill
their tasks as regulators, investors had to be informed of the corporation's
business. According to Brandeis, disclosure had to be "disclosure to the
investor." 49 As if scolding advocates of centralization, Brandeis noted that
filing statements with state or federal agencies or with the exchanges was
inadequate disclosure. "To be effective, knowledge of the facts must be
actually brought home to the investor, and this can best be done by requiring
the facts to be stated in good, large type in every notice, circular, letter and
advertisement inviting the investor to purchase. 50 As I argue in the following
sections, the idea that the individual shareholder could help regulate corporate
activities gained much support from Progressive scholars concerned not only
about monopoly but also about the power of those in control of corporations.
B. The Problem of Control
The practices that concerned decentralizers and centralizers were, for the
most part, grounded in greed. Seeking to maximize their profits, entrepreneurs
developed a variety of tools to gain them. They found ways to convince the
American public to invest in their enterprises, first in bonds and preferred
stock, and then, by the second decade of the twentieth century, in common
45.
46.

Id. at 17-18.
Id.

47. Id.
48. For one thing, Brandeis wanted directors in large businesses to be elected by regional
delegates who, in turn, would be elected by members of local units (each member having one
vote regardless of her capital contribution). Brandeis's model for this organization was the
English Cooperative Wholesale Society, in which directors were selected by votes of delegates
of retail societies, who were themselves selected by members of the local societies-that is,
consumers. BRANDEIS, supranote 41, at 208-23.
49. Id. at 104.
50.

Id.
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stock. And they found ways to manipulate stock prices as well as to drain the
corporation of assets purportedly intended to guarantee the payment of debt.51
As this section elaborates, gradually, these entrepreneurs also helped sustain the
growing separation of ownership (having an interest in an enterprise) from
control (having power over the enterprise). In the nineteenth century, those
who owned all or a majority of a corporation's stock controlled the corporation.
But in the early decades of the twentieth century, control came into the hands of
minority owners and financial institutions such as investment banks.
52
(Management control also developed at this time but was less significant.)
Public security financing of industry and finance began with the financing
of railroads in the mid-nineteenth century, although up to the 1880s there was
53
no important class of small individual or institutional investors in securities.
Government and railroad securities dominated the corporate securities markets,
and "most railroads and industrial firms were closely held by families or small
groups of investors." 54 Individuals invested their savings in bank deposits and
insurance, or in "their own small businesses, in other local enterprises, and in
real-estate mortgages." 55 There was no system of underwriting and the public
distribution of new securities "was done upon an agency basis with the risk
resting upon the issuer., 5 6 Beginning in the 1880s, however, rapid industrial
and business growth increased the demand for capital and "stimulated the use
of security financing as the most flexible and productive method of supplying

51. See MITCHELL, supra note 27 (arguing that the modem corporation was created to
manufacture stock to enrich financiers and corporate promoters).
52. In the early 1930s, Gardiner Means counted five different forms of control---complete
ownership, majority control, minority control, control through a legal device without majority
ownership, and management control. Means, supra note 18, at 72. The twentieth century
witnessed a shift from complete and majority ownership to minority control (often through legal
devices) te management control. But see Walter Werner, CorporationLaw in Search of Its
Future,81 COLUM. L. REv. 1611, 1629-44 (1981) (arguing that individual shareholders never
participated in the management of public corporations). It should also be noted that the
separation of ownership from control was never complete. Management typically owned shares
of its corporation.
53. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of
Representatives, 78th Congress, H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 (bills to suspend the
authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission under section 14(a) and section 14(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act to issue rules relating to the solicitation of proxies, consents, and
authorizations during the period of war emergency), June 9-11, 1943, at 2 [hereinafter Hearings
on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019].
54. Miguel Cantillo Simon, The Rise and Fall of Bank Control in the United States:
1890-1939, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 1077, 1080 (1998).
55. Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019, supra note 53, at 3.
56. Id.
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capital needs."5 7 By the mid-1910s, individual and institutional investors
5
1
to play an important role as a source of public security financing.
This development created a need for a system of underwriting and public
distribution of new issues, leading to the development of investment banking.
Their economic function was to channel the public's surplus savings into
productive business and industry:
The originating banker purchased the entire issue and practically
simultaneously resold it at an advance in price to a so-called purchase
group of which the originating banker became a member and the manager.
Usually, the issue was later resold at a further step-up in price to a larger
banking group of which the originating banker and members of the
purchase group were members and of which the originating banker was
manager. All purchases were joint and the purpose of the successive
formation of, and sales to, these groups was to spread the risk and expense
of purchase and carriage of the securities ....

Distribution or sale to the

investing public was accomplished solely by the manager in [sic] behalf of
the purchase or banking group whichever had last repurchased the issue,
through an organization of employees or agents which sometimes included
some members of the purchase or banking group. 59
This method of distribution was slow and costly. Moreover, it effected a
limited distribution-mostly to "institutional investors and wealthy individuals
with which the manager and his agents had a close customer relationship"-and
thus perpetuated the negligibility of the small individual investor as a source of
capital. 60 But with the growing demand for investment capital, and the rapid
usage of the corporate form of doing business, a more effective distribution had
developed. Instead of distribution by the manager of the banking group,
distribution was carried through by a large and widely dispersed selling group.
Members of the selling group were principals (not agents of the manager) and
by agreement were required to make "a concurrent public offering of the
securities at a uniform public offering price and at6 uniform concessions during
the period selected for the original distribution.", 1
The growth of business combinations and the resulting quest for capital
also led to the issuance of more common stock to draw in the public investor.
As the new system of securities distribution increased the participation potential
of small individual and institutional investors, the 1920s witnessed the widest
57.
58.
59.

Id. Until the 1890s, security financing was primarily in railroads.
Id. at4.
Id. at4-5.

60.

Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019, supra note 53, at 6.

61.

Id. at 7.
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participation rate in the securities market, up to that point, of the small,
individual purchaser. As Gardiner Means reported, "The three largest
corporations in the country, the American Telephone and Telegraph Co., the
Pennsylvania Railroad, and the United States Steel Corporation, all show[ed] a
tremendous growth in their list of stockholders." 62 The list of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company grew from 7,535 in 1900 to 454,596 in
1929; the list of Pennsylvania Railroad grew from 28,408 in 1902 to 157,650 in
1929; and the United States Steel Corporation saw a growth from 15,887 in
1901 to 110,166 in 1929. In 31 large corporations the total number of book
stockholders grew from 226,543 in 1900 to 1,419,126 in 1928.63
Initially, as stock ownership in large publicly held corporations became
more dispersed, the dispersal also reflected a shift of wealth. "By 1921, the
rich owned a very much smaller proportion of all corporate stocks than they had
owned in 1916." 64 But from 1921 to 1927, while shareholding continued
to
65
become more dispersed, the rich kept their proportion fairly constant.
Moreover, just as shareholding grew more dispersed, changes in corporate
law at the turn of the twentieth century eroded the individual shareholder's
ability to take part in managing the affairs of the corporation. The erosion of
the traditional ultra vires doctrine, which limited corporate activities to its
prescribed charter powers,6 6 and the reintroduction of the idea that the power of
the board of directors was "original and undelegated" rather than delegated
from the shareholders, helped minimize shareholder authority.67 So did
changing voting rules. Proxy voting, which was banned in the early nineteenth
century, became at the turn of the twentieth century the norm, authorized either
in a specific charter provision or a statutory provision. Gradually it became a
means by which voting power was taken away from the shareholders.
Shareholders' ability to remove directors at will was eliminated. In addition,
while in the nineteenth century a unanimous vote was required to effect
fundamental corporate changes, at the turn of the twentieth century states
gradually adopted statutes allowing a majority of the shareholders to sell
corporate assets. By 1926, the common law rule of unanimous vote was
abrogated by statute or judicial decisions in almost every state. 68
62. Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the UnitedStates, 44 Q.J.
ECON. 561, 563 (1930).
63. Id.
64. Id. at562.
65. Id.
66. HORWrTZ, supranote 36, at 77-78.
67. Id. at 99 (quoting Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918)).
68. On these transformations, see id. at 88-89 (documenting the erosion ofthe unanimity
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Perhaps more devastating to the individual shareholder's ability to
participate in corporate management was the fact that while share ownership
became more dispersed and businesses grew in size, their control became
concentrated. By the 1910s, banks began to play a triple role-they were
commercial lenders, institutional investors, and investment bankers. "By 1912,
18 financial institutions sat on the boards of 134 corporations with $25.325
billion in combined assets. Of these 18 institutions, 5 banks.., sat on the
boards of 68 nonfinancial corporations with $17.273 billion in assets.... U.S.
GNP in 1912 was $39.4 billion." 69
By virtue of their capital and social networks, investment bankers became,
as Brandeis put it in 1914, "[t]he dominant element in our financial
oligarchy. 70 They became promoters and directors of corporations, and were
able, through their economic power, to control even those boards on which they
did not sit. 7I Gradually, investment bankers replaced control through complete
ownership and even control through ownership of a majority of the votes (for
example, Henry Ford's control of the Ford Motor Company).72 In 1932, using
statistical data, Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means documented how
some 200 corporations, controlled by less than 1800 men, administered over
one-third of the national wealth.7 3
Having an interest in an enterprise no longer meant having power over the
enterprise. This separation of ownership from control allowed corporations
and, more seriously, the control group-an investment bank, a wealthy
individual, or management-to amass tremendous power over individuals,
groups, and even the state. 74 "Power without responsibility is, philosophically,
a perilous matter," Berle wrote in 1925, and "the history of minority-controlled

rule in the early twentieth century); Adam Winkler, "Other People's Money": Corporations,
Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 908-09 (2004) (noting how
changes in corporate voting rules during the late nineteenth century weakened shareholder
control).
69. Cantillo Simon, supra note 54, at 1080-81.
70. BRANDEIS, supra note 41, at 3.
71. See id.
at 1-27 (describing the confluence of factors supporting the concentration of
power in investment bankers).
72. Means, supra note 18, at 72-74.
73. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDnIER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (2d ed., 1968) (1932).
74. On the relationship between the separation of ownership from control and corporate
power, see Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th Century
American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 179, 186-87 (2005).
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the last thirty years amply demonstrates that the hazard is
corporations during
75
not imaginary.
The individual shareholder, who in the early decades of the twentieth
century gradually became a speculator,76 was not necessarily troubled by these
transformations, at least as long as she "held [a] soaring stock. 7 7 But
economists and lawyers raised concerns about the growing power ofthe control
group. They worried that the more dispersed stock ownership became, the
easier it was for the larger shareholders-life insurance companies, trust
companies, and banks-to control the activities of the corporation.7 8 In 1912,
Ripley pointed out that "the larger the number of shareholders, the more easily
may a small concentrated block of minority shares exercise sway over all of the
rest. 7 9 And in 1932, when Berle and Means called attention to the growing
separation of ownership from control in large business corporations, they
pointedly explained that individual shareholders lost control not only to
management, but also to larger investors who, even without owning a majority
of the shares, were able to elect the board of directors. 80
Generally, allowing less than unanimous consent to determine the outcome
of shareholder voting was not viewed as a serious concern. (Ripley, however,
called for regulation of situations when one company purchases not the entire
capital stock of another company but only 51% of it.) 81 It was expected that,
for the most part, "the interests of a minority owner run parallel to those of the
controlling majority and are in the main protected by the self-interest of the
latter. 8 2 In situations where their interests diverged, the minority owner would
suffer, but it seemed that such harm was an inevitable consequence of
corporate, or group, enterprise.8 3
75. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Non- Voting Stock and "Bankers' Control,"39 HARv. L. REV. 673,
674 (1925-26).
76. On this transformation, see MITCHELL, supranote 27, at chs. 4 & 8; Walter Werner,
Management, Stock Market and CorporateReform: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77
COLUM. L. REv. 388, 391-94 (1977).
77. RALPH F. DE BEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC: THE FORMATrE YEARS 7 (1964).
78. For a less concerned view of the control group, see Franklin S. Wood, The Status of
Management Stockholders, 38 YALE L.J. 57 (1928), arguing against imposing stricter fiduciary
duties on controlling stockholders.
79. RIPLEY, supra note 1, at 95.
80. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 73, at 66-111 (detailing the changing composition of
the control group).
81. William Z. Ripley, Minority Shareholdersin RailroadCombinations,26 Q.J. ECON.
377, 380 (1912).
82. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 73, at 68.
83. Id.
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Control by a minority of the owners-be it the investment banking house,
a small controlling block, or even management-was alarming. In 1925, Berle
called attention to the fact that because management stock would likely be
controlled by the investment banking house that served as a promoter for the
corporation, "it [was] possible, if not probable, that there [would] be attractive
opportunities for manipulation of securities, for negotiating favorable contracts
with allied interests, or even for giving value to stock which represent[ed] no
real investment."84 Given the "web of economic interests" which the
investment banking house served and from which it made its profits, it was
likely that management stock would be voted for transactions that benefited the
investment banking house, or even the controlling groups, but not the
controlled corporation. 5 Sharing Berle's views, William 0. Douglas labeled
the interests of investment banking houses "high finance," charging that they
were "interested solely in the immediate profit." 86 According to Douglas, the
interests of high finance were different from those of small individual
shareholders or even the corporation, but with the power of control, high
finance was able to profit by siphoning money from other investors.87
A small shareholder could theoretically launch a proxy contest to replace
seated directors. But as Berle and Means sarcastically pointed out, the only
example of a shareholder who succeeded in a proxy contest in the early
twentieth century was John D. Rockefeller in his fight with the management of
the Standard Oil Company of Indiana. 8 Rockefeller, who had owned 14.9% of
Standard Oil for years, became displeased with the company's management and
waged a proxy fight to replace it.8 9 As Berle and Means explained, he won
because of his relatively large ownership stake, his ability to fund the fight, and
his own standing in the community. 90 He won his fight for control because he
had control and he was wealthy. 91
84. Berle, supra note 75, at 676.
85. Id.
86. William 0. Douglas, The Forcesof Disorder,Address delivered at the University of
Chicago (Oct. 27, 1936) with additions from talks before the Economic Club of Chicago (Feb.

1, 1938) and before the Bond Club of New York (Mar. 24, 1937), in DEMOCRACY AND

FINANCE:

THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM 0. DouGLAs 9 (James Allen ed., 1940).
87. Id.
88. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 73, at 76.
89. Id. at 76-77.
90. Id. at 77-78.
91. More recently, Mark Roe offered the example of the ineptly managed General Motors,
the management of which was reinvigorated "by neither a proxy fight, nor a hostile takeover,
nor a leveraged buyout in reaction to the prospect of a takeover, but by the intervention of its
large shareholder. Pierre du Pont moved to Detroit, reorganized the company, and installed new

1526

63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503 (2006)

Moreover, a variety of legal tools developed to eliminate even the remote
possibility that a small individual shareholder would have a meaningful voice.
Not only were rules banning corporations from owning stock in other
corporations replaced with statutes allowing mergers and holding companies (as
early as 1889 in New Jersey), but a pyramid-style structure of ownership (that
is, holding stock of a corporation which owned a majority of the stock of a
subsidiary) became common.9 2 By investing in a corporation with a line of
subsidiaries, "each controlled through ownership of a majority of its stock by
the company higher in the series," an investor could exercise control while
having a very small ownership interest in the property so controlled. Beginning
in the 191 Os, restrictions on the voting rights of certain classes of shareholders
also became common. 93 "By issuing bonds and non-voting preferred stock" to
public investors in the subsidiaries (rather than voting stock), an investor could
exercise control by owning an even smaller percentage of the property.94 As
Ripley concluded in the mid- 1920s, the holding company was yet another way
to wrest control from the shareholders. 95 And while it was especially common
among public utilities,96 other examples included the Van Sweringens's control
over a transcontinental railway system, the Eaton's control over steel
companies, and Goldman Sachs & Co.'s control of a chain of affiliated
enterprises.97
Furthermore, while non-voting preferred stock was longstanding, in the
early decades of the twentieth century certain states, including Delaware and
New York, enacted statutory provisions allowing corporations to issue common
stock with different voting powers (including non-voting stock).9 8 Similarly,
corporations began issuing conditional or contingent voting stock, that is, stock
managers." Mark Roe, PoliticalTheory ofAmerican CorporateFinance,91 COLuM. L. REV.
10, 15 (1991). As Roe also pointed out, "the J.P. Morgan investment bank monitored many of
the country's railroads when reorganizing them at the turn-of-the-century." Id.
92. Winkler, supra note 68, at 907-08. The classic treatise on the holding company
remains JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY, ITS PUBLIC
SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS REGULATION (1932).
93. W.H.S. Stevens, Shareholders' Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting
Control, 40 Q.J. ECON. 353, 354-55 (1926). Prior to 1895, it was common to issue full voting
preferred and common stock. Id.
94. BERLE & MEANS, supranote 73, at 69-71.
95. See Evans Clark, CleaningHouse in Wall Street: ProfessorRipley Championsthe
Cause of the Small Investor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1927, at BRI (discussing Ripley's Main
Street and Wall Street).
96. Means, supra note 18, at 95.
97. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Stockholders: Their Rights and Duties, in HANDBOOK OF
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION 374, 387 (W.J. Donald ed., 1931).
98. BERLE & MEANS, supranote 73, at 72.
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that could vote only on the occurrence of a particular event. 99 The New York
Stock Exchange was opposed to privileging one class of common stock over
others and refused to list new issues of non-voting common stock. But a
different legal device-voting trusts-was allowed. It often gave the trustees
almost complete control over corporate affairs without any ownership
interest. 100
All these legal mechanisms transformed the relationship between
shareholders and their corporations. Ripley cautioned that democracy was
replaced with the autocracy of investment bankers,' 0' and Berle and Means
concluded in The Modern CorporationandPrivatePropertythat:
[T]he usual stockholder has little power over the affairs of the enterprise
and his vote, if he has one, is rarely capable of being used as an instrument
of democratic control. The separation of ownership and control has
become virtually complete. The bulk of the owners have in fact almost no
control over the enterprise, while 0those
in control hold only a negligible
2
proportion of the total ownership.

Berle and Ripley's analysis did not stop at critique. While in the early
decades of the twentieth century mandatory disclosure seemed a sufficient
means of regulating corporations, by the mid-1920s it was a necessary but
certainly not a sufficient solution to the problems associated with the growth of
the modem public corporation, especially to the problem of control. For one
thing, as Mark Roe has shown, by the 1930s the 0fragmentation
of financial
3
institutions supplemented disclosure as a solution.1
Berle and Ripley offered a different solution. As the following section
elaborates, they wanted to tame the power of the control group by creating a
countervailing power in the minority shareholders. 104 They wanted to change
99.
100.

Stevens, supranote 93, at 362-67.

101.

See Clark, supra note 95, at BRI (discussing Ripley's Main Street and Wall Street).

BERLE & MEANS, supra note 73, at 72-75; see also E.
Cushing's Voting Trusts, 29 HARv.L. REv. 237, 237-39 (1915)

Parmalee Prentice, HarryA.
(book review) (arguing that
voting trusts are not democratic). On different legal mechanisms of securing control, see also
RIPLEY, supra note 1, at 98-105.
102. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 73, at 83; see also Berle, supra note 75, at 673-93
(discussing the problems associated with investment bankers' control); Means, supranote 18, at
97 (noting that "[t]he individualism of Adam Smith's private enterprise has in large measure
given way to the collective activity of the modem corporation, and economic theory must shift
its emphasis from analysis in terms of competition to analysis in terms of control").
103. See generally MARK J.ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLmCAL
RooTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
104. It is interesting to note that in the nineteenth century, the typical intra-corporation
conflict was not between shareholders and management (as in the twentieth century) but
between different groups of shareholders. The Progressives' concerns about the role of minority
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the practices of corporate governance so as to use minority shareholders as a
means of preventing potential abuses of corporate power. While some reformers
sought to achieve this goal by imposing mandatory voting rights, Ripley and
Berle called for establishing permanent shareholder representative organizations
to communicate with management. By bringing to management's attention the
concerns of minority shareholders, not only of those in control, they hoped to
channel corporate power to socially beneficial goals. As I argue, viewing
shareholders as a proxy to this end ultimately led Berle to shift his focus from
organizing shareholders to imposing stricter fiduciary duties not only on
management (toward the corporation) but also on the control group toward
minority shareholders.
C. Voting, Organization,and Trust
Given the changes that corporations introduced in their voting rights
during the first decades of the twentieth century, it is perhaps not surprising that
reformers wanted to impose mandatory voting regimes to empower minority
shareholders. Take, for example, Eustace Seligman of Sullivan & Cromwell.
In the mid- 1920s, after criticizing the growingly popular corporate allocation of
different voting powers to different classes of common stock, Seligman
suggested that all common stock should have equal voting power.105 Viewing
the shareholders' right to vote as derived from their ownership interest,
Seligman described non-voting stock as depriving owners of one of the
essential attributes of property and allowing the concentration of power in the
hands of the few "in a manner inconsistent with the democratic tendencies of
our modern political, as well as business, life.' 0 6 (As already noted, the New
York Stock Exchange also opposed the practice of issuing non-voting stock.)
Moreover, Seligman wanted to mandate that, at all elections of directors, the
voting should be cumulative, or as he also put it, that there would be
shareholders reflected a transition from the nineteenth-century intra-corporate conflicts to the
twentieth-century internal struggles. Cf Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the
Corporation:Insightsfrom the History ofShareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1367-86 (2006). Between 1900 and 1914, several bills were introduced in Congress to protect
minority shareholders. MITCHELL, supranote 27, at ch. 6.
105.

Eustace Seligman, The Relation of Law to the Modem Developments in Property

Ownership, 11 PRoc. AcAD. POL. ScL. N.Y. 88,88-89 (1925).
106. Id. at 89. Reflecting his concerns about the attributes of ownership, Seligman also
suggested, as solutions to the problem of control, putting limits on a corporation's accumulation
of capital so as to force directors to distribute dividends, and giving employees rights to profit
through tools other than stock ownership-so as to avoid restraints on alienation of employee
stock. Id.at 98-10 1.
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proportional representation on the board. Alternatively, Seligman argued that
customers, employees, and the general public should be issued different classes
of stock, each entitled to elect a number of directors proportionate to the
number of shares of stock held by the class. 0 7 His was, perhaps, the first
articulation of the stakeholder model of corporate governance.
To allow minority shareholders to have a meaningful vote, Seligman also
insisted that corporate management be required to provide adequate financial
information to shareholders (and that management be prevented from using
corporate funds to defend itself in a proxy fight). 0 8 By eliminating
informational or financial advantages, Seligman wanted to level off the
battlefield between minority shareholders and those in control; he wanted to
eliminate, or at least minimize, intra-corporate power inequalities.
Like Brandeis's disclosure ideal, Seligman's solution was predicated upon
the twin assumptions that the shareholder's role in corporate management was
limited to the selection of directors and that shareholders wanted to play that
role. Like Brandeis, Seligman also seemed to assume that shareholders, by the
sheer power of their vote, would be able to constrain the power of the control
group(s).' 9 Both Brandeis and Seligman viewed shareholders as property
owners.
Other reformers did not share these assumptions. For one thing, they
maintained that in public corporations directors and officers did not derive their
power from the shareholders. Rather, the board of directors was an
independent body, created by the corporations statute, with original and
undelegated powers (including the power to appoint officers). Rather than
focusing on the voting power of shareholders as derived from their ownership
interest, reformers such as Ripley and Berle turned their attention to minority
shareholders as a body capable of balancing the power of those in control.
They recognized that the separation of ownership from control had undermined
traditional assumptions about the rights associated with property ownership.
Ripley viewed the disappearance of the individual producer as impairing
the march of the American civilization. "Our civilization," he wrote, "is
founded on the private possession of property. We hold that the enjoyment of
the fruits of labor through private property contributes to higher living
standards, progress, family life and happiness."'" 0 To prevent the risk that large

107. Id.at 90-91.
108. Id. at 93-98.
109. For additional calls to alter voting rights rules, see Stevens, supra note 93 (suggesting
the development of strong contingent voting stock rather than full voting stock).
110. RIPLEY, supra note 1, at 131-33.
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corporations might eliminate the individual producer, Ripley wanted to create
"some permanent agency" to represent "the shareholder's right, title, and
interest" and to awake "sufficient interest among the electorate to induce at least
an intelligent minority to take part.""' According to Ripley, "the participation2
"1
of such an intelligent minority" would make corporate democracy "tolerable."
Ripley compared his proposed shareholder organization to the labor union.
In a pointed statement he wrote:
The parallel between the post-war situation in the field of labor and that of
ownership and management of corporations is striking. The following
excerpt from President Wilson's Mediation Commission, substitution being
made of "shareholder" for "employees" is directly in point. "Broadly
speaking, American industry lacks a healthy basis of relationship between
management and men. At bottom this is due to the insistence by employers
upon individual dealings with their men. Direct dealings with employees'
organizations is still the minority rule in the United States .... The leaders
in industry must go further; they must help correct the state of mind on the
part of labor; they must aim for the release of normal feelings by enabling
labor to take its place as a cooperator in the industrial enterprise. In a
attempt must be made to generate a new spirit in
word, a conscious
3
industry."1l
If the result in the field of labor was "the introduction of employee investment,
of the company union, and even of labor membership on the board of
management," then, according to4 Ripley, similar solutions should be extended
also to the field of ownership.'"
One should be careful, however, not to read into Ripley's calls for the
establishment of shareholder organizations a strong support for active
shareholder participation in corporate decision-making. For one thing, Ripley
derived the idea from the temporary protective committees formed to protect
the property interests of security holders during corporate reorganizations. In
this vein, Ripley thought that the chief goal of the permanent shareholder
organization (which could take the form and role of the executive committee)
was to act as a supervisory council, especially with respect to the independent
auditing of accounts. It could elect the independent auditor who would be
accountable to it and act under its supervision." 5
111. Id. at 132-33.
112. Id. at 133.
113. Id. at 137.
114. Id. at 137-38.
115. RIPLEY, supra note 1, at 138-41. As ifanticipating the creation of the SEC,Ripley
noted that "the Federal Trade Commission or some other prominent govermental agency
should have jurisdiction over all such matters." Id. at 141-42.
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Ripley wanted to guarantee that minority shareholders' interests were
protected but, more crucially, the organization he imagined was meant to
impose checks and balances on corporate power as exercised by those in
control.'1 6 Ripley stressed that the goal of the permanent shareholder
organization was not to engage in wars with management." 7 Rather,
recognizing that "full responsibility and authority are... vested in the
directorate," Ripley wanted to create a liaison between the shareholders and
management-another check on corporate power." 8 By bringing minority
shareholders and management together, Ripley thought to make corporations
self-regulating. He assumed that cooperation between small individual
shareholders and management would limit potential abuses of corporate power
(especially by the control group).
Ripley's concluding remarks made clear these underlying assumptions.
Rather than giving voice to shareholders, the organization was meant to serve
as a medium of communication between management and the passive owners.
As if seeking management's approval, Ripley proclaimed that such an
organization would be extremely beneficial to management." 9 For example,
management would find it easier to raise capital if the organization endorsed
management's programs, and it would find it easier to receive sufficient proxies
to constitute a quorum if the organization advised shareholders as to how to
vote. Moreover, by keeping shareholders informed about management plans
and activities, a permanent shareholder organization would increase
shareholders' loyalty even120when the corporation endorsed a conservative
dividend distribution plan.
More important, according to Ripley, "positively the largest single grain of
comfort which directors of our great corporations might discover in this
proposed participation of shareholders [had] to do with possible amelioration of
their legal liability in dollars and cents."'12' Predicting an increase in fiduciary
duties litigation, Ripley suggested that "a representation or check-up committee
of shareholders" would afford a welcome relief to management. 22 As he put it:
It is not that such participation by the shareholders should hamper or really
divide responsibility--that would be a blunder; but rather that the fact the
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.at 133-42.
Id.at 136.
Id.
Id.at 144-55.
RIPLEY, supra note 1, at 144-51.
Id.at 152.
Id.at 153.
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board had taken counsel with such a continuing body, representative of
shareholder opinion and interest, should serve as proof of good faith in case
doubt should be raised or litigation pressed. Not even under delicate
circumstances, need disclosure necessarily be made of all the facts to all the
shareholders at the time. Not infrequently it might be impolitic in
midstream of negotiation to indulge in such revelation. But ifthe case were
squarely laid before the representative body, thereby affording an
opportunity for a free interchange of opinion in advance of action, it might
be an ever-present help to the directorate in time of trouble, especially as
against the allegation of private or personal advantage as a leading
motive. 123
Ripley might have included these comments to gain the support of the
business community, but his statements also reflected his particular view of
corporate power and the role of shareholders in taming it. Ripley believed that
corporations could self-regulate and he envisioned shareholders collaborating
with management to pursue corporate goals. Shareholder organization was
required not only as a solution to the problem of concentrating power in a few
hands, but also to make passive, widely dispersed owners interested in
corporate affairs. According to Ripley, solutions predicated upon individual
shareholder participation were bound to go wrong, but collective action had a
chance of success. As he put it, such an organization would be able to educate
the
individual shareholders to participate in the modem economy-to become
24
new individual producers and put the economy on a healthy track. 1
In the mid-i 920s, Berle shared Ripley's belief in self-regulation and the
corresponding vision of the shareholder's role in the corporation. Like
Seligman and Ripley, Berle described the development of large corporations as
creating "ownership which was irresponsible, and an extension not of
personality but of something infinitely stronger than that-a kind of nonpolitical sovereignty, a thing which was symbolized in the public mind by the
word 'monopoly." ' 125 Berle's solution was similar to Ripley's. He wanted to
create an intermediary organization between shareholders and management.
Specifically, Berle's early writings suggested the creation of an
organization (similar to the Investment Bankers Association)126 to scrutinize
123. Id.
124. Id. at 154-55; see also Ripley for Audits by Stockholders: Harvard'sEconomist
Believes Authorized Committees Would Assure Publicity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1926, at 40
(reporting on Ripley's article in The World's Work).
125. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The New Deal and Economic Liberty, 178 ANNALS OF THEAM.
AcAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 37, 41 (1935).

126. The Investment Bankers Association was formed in 1912, a year after Kansas passed
the first blue-sky law to regulate sale of securities by out-of-state corporations. Its goal was "to
secure greater uniformity in state and federal laws, governing the issuance, purchase, and sale of
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"the corporate organization of the enterprises whose securities they float. '1 2 7
Given management's dependence on the investment banker, Berle believed the
association could help limit management power with respect to the rights of
investors (while allowing management to exercise its power to conduct the
enterprise). 128 In a similar manner, Berle believed that the different depositary
institutions (or trust companies) could serve as a liaison "between the corporate
management and the stockholders."' 129 As he explained, these institutions were
better situated than the shareholder to keep informed "as to the affairs of the
corporation whose stock was deposited with them." 130 Moreover, "as
representing their clients, [they] could take the action necessary to prevent or
rectify violations of property rights where they occurred." 131
In short, while Seligman wanted to give shareholders the voting rights
derived from ownership, Berle and Ripley wanted to create permanent
institutions that would protect shareholders. Fearing that minority shareholders
might not be willing or able to protect themselves, they wanted to establish
intermediary organizations to help make corporations self-regulating.
Interestingly, Berle's and Ripley's ideas resonated with a proposal made at
a meeting of the Association of Partners of Stock Exchange Firms on January
7, 1914. Seeking to gain the confidence of investors, the proposal, made by
Herman B. Baruch, suggested concentrating the voting power of individual
shareholders by appointing a committee to vote the proxies of stock held by
brokerage firms for account of clients. (It was estimated that the committee
32
would vote thousands of proxies, representing millions of dollars of stock. )1
"It was generally agreed that a concentration of voting power would
undoubtedly go far to correct errors of management in corporations, provided
that the committee handling the proxies knew exactly what to do."' 33 At the
securities." MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL

8(1970).

More

important, it wanted to improve the prestige of the investment banking profession by
strengthening the means of self-regulation. Id.at 8-9. While in the 1910s, the Investment
Bankers Association also supported federal regulation to eliminate securities fraud, the
prosperity of the 1920s restored the Association's "faith in its own ability to discipline the
securities industry." Id. at 21. It withdrew its support for federal regulation and insisted instead
that, with the Association's administrative assistance, state legislation was adequate and
sufficient. Id.at 20-21, 5-21.
127. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 37 (1928).
128. Id.
129. Id.at 38-39.
130. Id.at 39.
131. Id.
132. The Brokers 'Aim: Wall Street Men Seek to Regain Esteem ofPublic by Protecting
Stockholders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1914, § 8, at 7.
133. Id.
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very least, it seemed that such a committee could get information from the
34
corporation to individual shareholders (who rarely could get it themselves). 1
Collective bargaining and self-regulation were common Progressive
solutions; Progressives envisioned the new state as composed of multiple
centers of power. But such ideas were short lived. A different idea---one that
Berle articulated-ultimately won over. Berle complemented self-regulation by
strengthening the fiduciary obligations of the control group.135 For one thing,
he argued that the control group could not, without full disclosure, allow one
class of stock to appropriate to its benefit any portion ofthe capital contribution
of any other class of stock.136 In addition, the control group would be subject1to
37
fiduciary duties even when it exercised the voting rights of its own stock.
Finally, those in control were to be held "jointly liable with directors for
mismanagement of corporate affairs,"
unless they could prove that they did not
38
assent to the acts of the directors.
While he did not necessarily believe in the ability of shareholders to
participate in corporate management, Berle strongly believed in the potential
effectiveness of fiduciary duties. In The Modern Corporationand Private
Property,Berle (influenced both by his co-author, Means, and the 1929 crash)
abandoned the ideal of self-regulation and instead emphasized the importance
of strictly enforcing trust relationships between those in control (directors,
officers, and 39 controlling shareholders) and the corporation and its
shareholders. 1
Berle did not envision shareholders as regulators, but he viewed imposing
fiduciary duties toward them as a means of constraining corporate power. He
believed that forcing the control group to take into account the needs of the
individual shareholder would channel corporate power toward socially
beneficial goals.' 40 Berle, who, according to his biographer, wanted to be
known as the Marx of the shareholders, 14 1 did not seek to empower
shareholders to make their own decisions regarding corporate affairs. Rather,
134. Id.; see also Proxy Committee to Protect Owners: H.B. Baruch Suggests a New Idea
to the Association of Stock Exchanges Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1914, at 15.
135. Berle, supra note 75, at 682-93.
136. Id. at 682-86.
137. Id. at 686-90.
138. Id. at 690.
139. Tsuk, supra note 74, at 189-94.
140. Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate
Law, 151 U. PENN. L. REv. 1861, 1892-93 (2003).
141. JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN
ERA 62 (1987).
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he wanted to use minority shareholders to control corporate power. He used
shareholders' disempowerment to impose fiduciary duties on management and
the control group for the benefit of the corporation and society.
Berle and Ripley were concerned about the disappearance of the
individual shareholder. Yet they had a broader goal: They wanted to protect
minority shareholders so that they could limit or tame the power of those in
control. By guaranteeing shareholder protection, albeit not empowerment, they
avoided addressing potential conflicts between the shareholders' perceptions of
their interests and broader corporate goals. In any event, as the following Part
explores, by the time the New Deal administration came to power concerns
about corporate hierarchies replaced concerns about corporate power. Rather
than viewing shareholders as a means of taming the power of those in control,
scholars and reformers focused on the minority shareholder's vulnerable
position in the corporate hierarchy. As we will also see, vulnerability was an
individual condition. Those viewing the shareholder as investor wanted to
guarantee that the individual shareholder was informed, while those describing
the shareholder as participant wanted to ensure that her (individual) voice was
protected. For the most part, the idea of shareholder empowerment through
organization had disappeared.
III. 1930s-1970s: Consumerism, Democracy, andIts Limits
A. DisclosurePartII: Regulating Markets
Throughout the 1920s, many celebrated the separation of ownership from
control and the rise of professional management as creating increased corporate
gains and profits. Management was seen as "the prime mover of business-the
42
veritable fountain-head of economic security for the bulk of the population."'
By the end of 1929, management controlled 44% of the 200 largest U.S.
corporations. 43 Of the remaining corporations, 23% were controlled by
minority ownership, 21% through legal devices such as pyramiding, 5% by
majority ownership, and 6% were in private ownership.'44 As Gardiner Means
concluded:
65% of the companies and 80% of their combined wealth [were] controlled
by either the management or by a legal device involving a small proportion
of ownership.... Only 11% of the companies and 6% of their combined
142.
143.
144.

Business Versus the Public, 8 ACCT. REv. 162, 162 (1933).
Means, supra note 18, at 94.
Id.
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wealth involved control by a group of individuals owning half or more of
the stock interest outstanding. 4

Railroads tended to be more management controlled, while public utilities had
a greater use of legal devices (voting trust, non-voting stock, and special voteweighted stock). Industrial corporations showed the least
separation of
146
ownership and control, but were moving in that direction.
As we saw in the previous Part, corporate law was changing to increase
managerial power and consequently decrease the power of the shareholders.
Moreover, as the separation of ownership from control grew, paid executives
were taking over the power of the board of directors. And while letting
professional executives run corporations was potentially advantageous, due to
the absence of federal laws requiring and regulating corporate disclosure and
inadequate self-regulation by the exchanges, this change also created
tremendous imbalances of power, helping those individual entrepreneurs and
businessmen seeking to benefit at the expense of the public. As one editorial
put it, "[m]any managements, swollen with power, came to believe that their
enterprises had ceased to be reservoirs of trust funds for stockholders and
147
creditors but had become agencies for their own private immediate gain."'
Huge salaries and bonuses, management's participation in its own
underwriting, using corporate funds to manipulate the market, and other forms
of self-dealing became common. Rather than an "economic savior,"
management turned out to be "often without vision, incapable of selfregulating, unmindful of duties to investors,
and almost unaware of its
8
responsibilities to society as a whole."14
The market's collapse in October 1929 painfully brought home the
consequences of the "feverish activity of speculation" that characterized the
1920s.149 But the blame for the crash was laid not only on speculation, but also
on the fraudulent practices which helped fuel speculation: inadequate corporate

145. Id.
146. Id. at 95. As Means himself recognized, management often owned shares of its
corporations. His data and analysis were not meant to draw a sharp distinction between
management and shareholders, but to emphasize the shift from controlling shareholders, who
did not necessarily sit on boards or held executive positions, to management control. Means did
not assess management's ownership interest in the corporations he studied. For an analysis of
Means's data, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Remarks delivered at a conference at Columbia Law
School on "The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis" (Nov. 17, 2006) (on file with
the author).
147. Business Versus the Public,supra note 142, at 163.
148. Id.
149. DE BEDTS, supra note 77, at 11.
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reporting, self-perpetuating, managements manipulating insider information,
and faulty credit control. 50 As that same editorial put it:
Under the urge of eager investors, scrupulous promotion was well on the
way of becoming a lost art. Investment bankers, competing with each
other, began to capitalize once stable enterprises on the basis of highly
speculative future returns. Business leaders were enunciating strange
times-earnings theories to justify high stock prices. Profits were being
inflated by unrealized appreciation of assets, scant provisions for
depreciation, omissions of ingeniously discovered non-recurring changes,
and other5 losses mysteriously applicable to surplus rather than current
earnings.1 1
The consequences were devastating. The losses were tremendous.
According to one report, "in the ten years before 1933, total investor losses
through worthless securities were approximately $25 billion, or half of all those
issued."' 15 2 According to the same report, even before the Depression,
investors' losses "reached a staggering annual total of $1.7 billion, of which
$500 million alone was accounted for within the state of New York."' 153 Not
surprisingly, the New York Stock Exchange became the focal point for
reform. 154
The New York Stock Exchange proclaimed its attempts to self-regulate. It
recorded "its opposition to the issuance of nonvoting common stocks, and
urged its listed companies to publish their quarterly earnings.'155 But selfregulation proved ineffective, especially with respect to disclosure. Neither the
stock exchanges, which refused to enforce strict disclosure standards upon
listed companies for fear of losing securities to other exchanges, nor the
Investment Bankers Association were able to provide full disclosure to
investors. Moreover, none of these private institutions was willing thoroughly
to examine their members' conflicts of interest. For the most part, these were
like private clubs "in which members could do no wrong, so long as their
behavior toward each other was governed by club rules.' 56 Their selfregulation was often meant to protect their members rather than the investing
157
public.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 5-6 (1934).
Business Versus the Public, supra note 142, at 162.
DE BEDTS, supranote 77, at 11.
Id.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 15.
DE BEDTS, supra note 77, at 12-28; PARRISH, supra note 126, at 36-41.
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The collapse of self-regulation as a means of regulating the securities
markets eclipsed Progressive concerns about the power of corporations and the
control group. Revelations of investment bankers' and management's conflicts
of interest and the consequential fraud on the market helped shift policymakers'
and scholars' attention from regulating the internal structure of corporations
back to regulating the market for securities and investments. As Berle put it in
The Nature of the Difficulty (a memorandum co-written with Louis Faulkner
and discussed with Roosevelt, Raymond Moley, Jim Angell, Rexford Tugwell,
and Sam Rosenman), the investment banking community had maintained "an
attitude of irresponsibility," viewing investment bankers as merchants with no
responsibility to assure the value of the sold merchandise. 15 ' Berle
recommended the establishment of a federal body to "perform the functions of a
federal Blue Sky Commission."159
Mark Roe has recently demonstrated how the continued hostility to
investment institutions was reflected in attempts to limit the ability of these
institutions to own or deal with securities. 6° In 1906, the Armstrong
investigation into the insurance industry led New York to prohibit insurance
companies from buying stock.161 In 1933, the Pecora investigation of banking
and securities practices led to the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act, 162 which
"prohibited bank affiliates from owning and dealing in securities, thereby
severing commercial banks from investment banks."' 163 And in 1940, the
Investment Company Act achieved a similar severance in the mutual funds
industry by requiring mutual funds to be highly diversified (hence have no
control over their portfolio companies) and by discouraging directors and
officers of mutual funds from sitting on boards of their portfolio companies.164
As if reflecting the cultural rejection of large investment institutions, the House
Report on the Securities Exchange Act noted that "as management became
divorced from ownership and came under the control of banking groups, men
forgot that they were dealing with
the savings of men and the making of profits
65
became an impersonal thing."'
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Still, regulating investment institutions was only one of the ways through
which New Dealers hoped to restore investors' faith in the securities market.
As industrial activity and progress became "dependent upon a bewildering
array of financial and organizational tools: bonds, debentures, cumulative and
non-cumulative preferred stock, and common stock...,"16 the administration
was also keen to guarantee that these tools would survive the Depression.
Roosevelt determined to bring an end to speculation-"The joy and moral
stimulation of work no longer must be forgotten in the mad chase of evanescent
profits" he said in his inaugural address. 67 Informed by the positions of
centralization and decentralization alike, Roosevelt determined to let in "the
light of day on issues of securities,
foreign and domestic, which are offered for
68
sale to the investing public."'1
Regulating the market and regulating corporations were not mutually
exclusive positions. Indeed, Seligman, Berle, and Ripley, while seeking to
protect minority shareholders as a group, also emphasized the need for adequate
disclosure.
Seligman demanded that management provide adequate
69
information to shareholders in order to make shareholder voting meaningful. 1
Ripley believed that permanent shareholder organizations would help supervise
independent audits of the company's books.' 70 In a New York Times article,
written shortly after the publication of Main Street and Wall Street, he
proclaimed that "the greatest single need for the protection of the public was
adequate publicity by means of intelligible financial statements... coupled
with a markedly higher standard of accountability to be anticipated at the hands
of the courts.' 7 1 Finally, Berle viewed the fiduciary duties of management and
the control group as encompassing a duty to disclose.172 Shortly after the crash,
he and Means pointedly argued that corporate information was not simply a
private matter of interest only to shareholders. 73 They wanted corporations to
provide the market with periodic statements, statements pertaining to
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extraordinary activities, information provided to74 brokerage firms, as well as
information provided to financial publications.
In the 1930s, however, the obsession with disclosure obscured the need to
regulate intra-corporate relations. Berle urged Roosevelt to create a federal
body with powers to plan, stimulate, and stabilize economic activity; he even
suggested considering a federal incorporation act.175 The other brain trusters,
Moley and Tugwell, an economist, did, too. 17 6 But Roosevelt believed that
when bankers' activities were exposed to public scrutiny, self-interest would be
curbed.177 The different drafts of the Securities Act of 1933 thus reflected the
idea that federal legislation should be limited to requiring "full and fair
disclosure of the nature of the security being offered and that there
should be no
178
authority to pass upon the investment quality of the security."'
The different drafts of the Securities Act of 1933 aimed to guarantee that
all new securities would be registered and that issues of new securities would
be "accompanied by full publicity and information and that no essentially
important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying
public.' 79 Reformers wanted corporations to disclose information about the
corporation's business, its capital structure (including equity, debt, and
income), the corporation's allocation of voting rights, preferences, and dividend
rights, the private interests of the underwriting syndicate and the corporation in
the new issue, as well as the purposes for which the new issue's proceeds were
to be used. They wanted corporations to disclose this information both in a
registration statement filed with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and in
prospectuses issued to the public. 80 But the 1933 Act did not grant power to
the FTC to assess the quality of the securities issued, and it exempted from its
coverage securities already issued as well as securities issued intrastate, and
several other categories.' 81 As Felix Frankfurter pointedly noted, the 1933 Act
was "a belated and conservative attempt to curb the recurrence of old abuses

174. Id.at 278.
175. SELIGMAN, supra note 168, at 41-51.
176. Id. at40-41.
177. Id.at 39-63. On the renewed interest in federal incorporation during the early New
Deal, see also Loomis & Rubman, supranote 35, at 161.
178. See SELIGMAN, supra note 168, at 63 (quoting James Landis's recollection of the
drafting of the Securities Act of 1933).
179. PARRISH, supranote 126, at 47 (quoting from Roosevelt's message in support of the
first draft).
180. Id.at 48-49; SELIGMAN, supra note 168, at 67-79.
181. SELIGMAN, supra note 168, at 70-71.
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which, through failure of adequate legislation, had attained disastrous
proportions."182
The 1933 Act aimed to restore public confidence in the markets by giving
"impetus to honest dealing in securities."'18 3 Gone were the earlier decades'
concerns about corporate power and the rapid separation of ownership from
control. The drafters of the final bill embraced the view that modem business
and finance could be regulated only through the combination of flexible
national administration, existing state regulation, and "individual freedom to
make investment decisions."' 84 Instead of curbing corporate power through
national or local regulation as the early advocates of disclosure suggested, the
New Dealers trusted the individual investors-the consumers-to tame it.
Traced back to Walter Weyl's New Democracy (1912), this approach was not
predicated upon the creation of venues for Americans "to confront the
impersonal world of big business and centralized markets ... as members of
traditional communities or as bearers of a new nationalism.' 85 Rather, it rested
on the assumption that individuals would be better off facing the modem
economy as "enlightened, empowered consumers."' I8 6 As Roosevelt described
the Act, it was meant to add' to87the rule of caveatemptor, "the further doctrine,
'let the seller also beware." 1
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 followed suit. While the New
York Stock Exchange was trying to demonstrate, as late as 1933, that it could
regulate its members, even businessmen rapidly emphasized the need for
federal regulation to prohibit "costly manipulations" and guarantee the flow of
information to investors.1 88 The 1934 Act thus focused on the registration of
the stock exchanges and the requirement that firms traded on these exchanges
file annual and quarterly reports with a newly established agency, which the
Act created-the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Act further
prohibited certain manipulative devices such as short selling, which corporate
insiders and exchange members used to exploit the market, and it regulated
insider trading by both management and controlling shareholders. 189 Moreover,
it limited the formation of control groups by requiring individuals or groups
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owning more than 5% of a corporation's stock to file with the SEC. 190 In order
to prevent fraudulent reporting, the Act also required "certified periodical
audits for any corporation listing its securities on a national exchange."' 9' As to
the shareholders' role in the corporation-the 1934 Act put their fate in the
hands of the SEC, which was authorized to adopt rules regarding proxy voting
92
when appropriate "in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
As we will see, in the 1940s the SEC would use its power to promulgate the
shareholder proposal rule.
B. William 0. Douglas's Crusade
The business community did not welcome the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Of
particular concern were the liability clauses of the 1933 Act, which imposed
civil liability on corporations and their officers for fraud and for misstatements
in the registration statement, 93 and the limitations on the powers of the
exchanges that the 1934 Act imposed. Those advocating broader corporate
reform were also not satisfied. In an article published several months after the
1933 Act was passed, Berle cautioned that, while the Act sought to eliminate
financial fraud, it did not resolve the crucial "problem of power arising from
financial control exercised by investment bankers." 94
Meanwhile, the number of individual shareholders continued to rise. By
1934, the House Report on the Securities Exchange bill estimated that more
than 10 million individuals owned stocks or bonds, and that "over one fifth of
all the corporate stock outstanding in the country [was] held by individuals with
net incomes of less than $5,000 a year."1 95 In addition, it noted that:
Over 15,000,000 individuals [held] insurance policies, the value of which
[was] dependent upon the security holdings of insurance companies. Over
13,000,000 men and women [had] savings accounts in mutual savings
banks and at least 25,000,000 [had] deposits in national and State banks
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and trust companies-which
[were] in turn large holders of corporate
96
stocks and bonds.
For many, these growing numbers of shareholders supported the idea that
shareholders were merely investors. But the vision of the shareholder as a
participant or member in need of protection did not disappear. Indeed, it was
powerfully reiterated in 1934 by William 0. Douglas, soon to be the SEC
chairman.
Douglas emphasized that the newly enacted securities laws offered some
protection to shareholders by requiring accurate disclosure in the proxy
solicitation process, but he did not think disclosure was sufficient. First, like
Brandeis, Douglas thought that disclosure was inadequate if it meant
"registration in some dusty file in Washington or in some state capitol."' 197 He
wanted mandatory disclosure "in the sense of direct and unequivocal statement
in the periodical reports to stockholders."' 98 In this respect, Douglas would
demand disclosure of directors' compensation, the shares traded during any
given period, as well as directors' affiliations and conflicts of interests. 99 But
Douglas also believed that in certain situations, only direct prohibition could be
effective (for example, demanding the separation of commercial from
investment banking as under the Glass-Steagall Act).2°°
Concerned about the separation of ownership from control, Douglas also
feared that "[p]ublicity and prohibition alone are too feeble for the task at hand
even when they carry adequate enforcement machinery."2 ' Shareholders were
simply too passive. As Douglas put it, given that shareholders in large public
corporations "seldom have the desire or the initiative to act, or the ability to act
intelligently," even with full information flow, proxy voting was likely to
sustain management's control over the board.20 2
To make disclosure more effective, Douglas wanted the SEC to buttress
standards of trusteeship and responsible management through its power to
regulate corporate information. As he put it before the meeting of the
International Management Congress, misrepresentation in dealing with security
holders "is a direct undermining of that free economic system which is
196. Id. at 3-4.
197. William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305, 1323
(1934).
198. Id.
199. Id.On Douglas's tracing of the establishment of the SEC to ideas expressed in Other
People'sMoney, see DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 86, at vi.
200. Douglas, supranote 197, at 1323-25.
201. Id.at 1325.
202. Id.at 1316, 1307-17.
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necessary for the preservation and perpetuation of capitalism under a
democratic form of government. 20 3 Management's diligence and tireless
devotion to the standard of fiduciary responsibility toward its shareholders was
the SEC to take
the cornerstone of Douglas's democratic vision, and he2wanted
4
0
a more active role to make corporations conform to it.
Moreover, Douglas viewed shareholders as participants in corporate
affairs. Like Seligman, Douglas wanted to eliminate "non-voting, qualified
voting, or contingent voting shares," and to add mechanisms such as
"cumulative voting, pluralistic voting, or division of stock into blocks, each
block electing a specified number of directors and no more. 20 5 He hoped that
such mechanisms would empower "scattered and disorganized" investors.20 6
But, like Berle and Ripley, Douglas also saw in organization the most important
20 7
means of empowering shareholders or, at the very least, of protecting them.
Informed by the successes of the English Shareholders Protection Association
and by the creation of shareholders protective committees during
reorganization, Douglas wanted shareholders to form groups that could pressure
corporate boards. 20 8 As he explained:

The device needed is one which will give these scattered and disorganized
investors group strength and power so that they can gain admittance to the
councils of business and make their influence felt around the negotiation
table or in the courts. Letting each investor look out for himself merely
accentuates the conditions giving rise to the need for regulation and makes
more likely the recurrence of abuses which have cost the investor so dearly
in recent years.21 9
Although Douglas followed in Berle's and Ripley's tradition, it is
important to notice the nuances that distinguished their approaches. While
Berle and Ripley were concerned about different groups exercising control over
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the corporation, Douglas's concern was about management's control.21 ° While
Berle and Ripley endorsed self-regulation, Douglas advocated a combination of
self-regulation and government supervision (or administration). 1
Accordingly, he urged that shareholders organize on a national basis with
"some form of governmental approval or backing. 2 12 Douglas was also more
explicit about the role that shareholder organization would serve. While Ripley
and Berle believed that shareholder organizations should aim to cooperate with
management, Douglas viewed organization as constraining management's
actions. As he pointedly put it, if such an organization were to develop, "as it
easily can, into a respectable and vigilant organization, management would
2 13
always gauge its policy by its vulnerability at the hands of such agency."
Moreover, while Ripley and Berle viewed shareholder organization as helping
to self-regulate corporate power, Douglas envisioned a different role. He
wanted the organization not only to protect stockholders "against the board or
the officers," but to serve "as effectively in any case where bondholder,
debenture holder, note holder, creditor, or stockholder needed protection. 2 14 In
short, while he remained concerned about potential abuses of corporate power
by those in control, the more important issue for Douglas was corporate
hierarchy. He wanted the shareholders protective organization to help any
member of the corporate community who needed protection against
management.2 15
Notwithstanding such nuances, Douglas, like Berle and Ripley before him,
was of two minds when assessing the shareholder's role in the large public
corporation. On the one hand, Douglas wanted to empower the vulnerable,
individual investor. On the other hand, he did not trust shareholders to make
decisions for the greater social good. Interestingly, his solution resembled
Berle's. While Berle wanted to impose fiduciary duties on management and
the control group as a means of constraining their power, Douglas wanted to
impose such duties on the shareholders organization itself. He insisted that the
210. By the mid-1930s, management still owned a relatively small proportion of its
corporation's shares. R.A. Gordon, Stockholding of Officers and Directors in American
IndustrialCorporations,50 Q. J. EcoN. 622 (1936); R.A. Gordon, Ownership by Management
and Control Groups in the Large Corporation,52 Q. J. EcoN. 367 (1938). It is important to
note, however, that this small share ownership represented a large percent of management's
personal income. Mitchell, supra note 146.
211. Louis Loss, The ProtectionofInvestors: The Role of Government,80 S. AFRIcAN L.J.
53, 61 (1963).
212. Douglas, supranote 197, at 1332.
213. Id. at 1333.
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shareholders organization had to be organized "as a quasi-public corporation on
a service rather than on a profit-making basis."2 1 6 As such, it was required to
act in the public interest.
When the stock market again collapsed in 1937, shortly after Douglas
became chairman of the SEC, he put his plans for shareholder organization on a
backburner and turned his attention to the regulation of the exchanges.217 On
November 23, 1937, the SEC issued its demand for the New York Stock
Exchange reorganization (specifically to democratize it and to adopt short-sale
trading rules). 21 8 "Fair play and simple honesty are a part of our inheritance.
Individualism is our pole star," Douglas told the Association of Stock Exchange
Finns. 219 As he saw it, the exchanges were "the greatest market places in the
world," and he wanted to guarantee that the consumers-buyers and sellers
alike-were able to trust the 22market.220 The SEC, he stressed, was "first and
last the investors' advocate. 1
Douglas pushed the SEC toward a more statist, regulatory position. But
he was never able to pass his proposed federal licensing or incorporation
statute. Nor was he able to gain support for the idea of permanent shareholder
organizations. Indeed when, in 1942, the SEC adopted rules to promote
shareholder democracy, under the chairmanship of Ganson Purcell (Douglas
resigned in 1939 to accept a seat on the Supreme Court), it was a different
notion of democracy than the one Douglas, following Berle and Ripley,
favored. Not only did it focus solely on corporate hierarchies rather than on
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corporate power, it also sought to empower individual shareholders by
protecting their individual rights rather than through organization.
C. Democracy
The main actors in the history of the SEC believed that its role was to
promote capitalism. Given the failure of self-regulation, they viewed
government planning as required to guarantee the financial stability that could
sustain capitalism. They presumed that the SEC would both "encourage
rational organization within private groups and between private groups in order
to achieve that stability," and eliminate those market practices that threatened
222 In short, the SEC "was both policeman and promoter;
it.
a vehicle for reform
and a shield against more violent224change. 2 23 It became a symbol of both
economic and political tranquility.
By the early 1940s, even the business community came to believe that "the
law, effectively enforced, assisted financial operations by policing marginal
elements within the industry and by promoting minimum standards of
disclosure."' 225 As more businessmen joined the government's war efforts, their
influence grew. Gradually, it also became apparent that the SEC was not
"opposed to business institutions or the profit motive. 2 26 In fact, it seems that
the commissioners and staff members "looked upon the SEC as an extension of
business enterprise., 227 Between 1934 and 1940, the Commission, "utilizing
full disclosure, investigations, stop orders, stock exchange surveillance, and
participation in utility organization, only reduced opportunities for corporate
theft and restricted the methods by which individuals, while inflicting
pecuniary damage upon one another, could derange the entire economy."' 228 It
was in this atmosphere that the SEC recommended an overall change to the
proxy rules.
Generally, state corporation statutes and charters govern shareholder
voting. They determine which issues (in addition to the election of directors)
require shareholder voting as well as the particular procedures that voting
processes should follow. Historically, shareholders had to attend the annual
222.
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meeting to vote. But, as already noted, with the rise of the large public
corporation, proxy voting became the norm, gradually helping to disenfranchise
the individual shareholder. Seeking to restore investors' confidence in the
market for securities,
the 1934 Act explicitly addressed problems associated
229
voting.
with proxy
Section 14 of the 1934 Act was meant to regulate proxy solicitation and
eliminate the proxy abuse about which Berle, Ripley, Douglas, and their
contemporaries expressed deep concern. The section was not intended to
empower shareholders, but only to "enhance management communication with
stockholders within the framework of existing state corporation law. 2 30 From
1934 through 1942, the SEC promulgated rules to encourage management to
communicate with shareholders, as well as to encourage communication among
stockholders themselves.23'
The SEC might have been successful in encouraging management to
provide information to shareholders, but many corporations refused to refer to
shareholders' proposed actions in their proxy solicitations.232 In 1939,
Bethlehem Steel Corporation refused to include in its proxy solicitation Lewis
Gilbert's request for a shareholder vote on "moving the annual meeting site
from Wilmington, Delaware to New York City, and to change the bylaws to
allow stockholders to elect the auditors. 2 33 When Gilbert notified the SEC, it
advised Bethlehem Steel to postpone the scheduled meeting in order to give
23
stockholders the opportunity to revoke their proxies. 3 Bethlehem Steel
"adjourned the meeting, and sent out a second proxy statement that made
2 35
reference to Gilbert's proposed actions.
Shortly thereafter the SEC's Office of General Counsel undertook
236 a study
of the proxy regulations and, in 1942, suggested a number of changes. These
changes aimed to provide shareholders with the information necessary to enable
them to exercise their voices, for example by requiring corporations to disclose
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executive compensation in excess of $25,000.217 They also sought to give
individual shareholders more meaningful voices in corporate management, for
example, by allowing them to nominate director and auditor candidates in the
company's proxy material and by eliminating the practice of treating unmarked
proxies as affirmative positive votes. 2 38 Finally, the changes proposed adopting
a rule requiring management to include proposals from security holders in its
proxy solicitation, to allow shareholders to vote on these proposals, and, if
management opposed the proposal, to allow the proponent to include a 100word supporting statement.23 9 (Before this recommended change, management
and
only had to include a summary of the proposal in the proxy material
40
provide an opportunity for shareholders to indicate their preferences.)
The changes were limited. They did not aim to empower shareholders.
Their goal was to assure to shareholders rights that they traditionally held under
state law and that the dispersion of stock ownership had rendered meaningless,
including the right "to appear at the meeting; to make a proposal; to speak ' on
24 1
that proposal at appropriate length; and to have [the] proposal voted on. ,
The changes were meant to create a deliberative corporate democracy,
although, for the most part, it was created by allusion only.
The business community overwhelmingly opposed the changes, especially
the rule requiring disclosure of executive compensation and the rule eliminating
"management discretion in voting unmarked proxies., 242 Most corporations
masked their objections as attempting to prevent the imposition of additional
burdens on business during the war. But, with the war for democracy as
important rhetoric, there was relatively little business opposition to the
shareholder proposal rule (or to the rules allowing shareholders to nominate
directors and auditors).243
The SEC took business opposition into account and, on December 18,
1942, promptly after Congress recessed, released a watered-down version of the
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new proxy rules. 244 Reacting to the general feeling that executives should not
profit from the war effort, the SEC strengthened the rule requiring disclosure of
executive compensation (by requiring disclosure of compensation in excess of
$20,000).245 At the same time, the SEC reacted to fears about burdening
corporations, whose contributions were crucial to the war effort, by omitting the
rule prohibiting management from using unmarked proxies as well as the rule
allowing shareholders to nominate directors and auditors. 246 Opponents of the
latter seemed to have convinced
the SEC that it would only lead to "insincere or
247
frivolous nominations. ,
Although they were not as vocal about it, business groups were also
opposed to the shareholder proposal rule and any other form of "further
legitimizing shareholder activism." 248 In various disparaging comments about
the knowledge, intentions, and ability of small shareholders, business groups
proclaimed that the rule would "allow 'crack-pots' to make virtually
meaningless statements" ;249 that it "would put 'dangerous weapons in the hands
of the professional troublemaker' ;2S that it "would open the door wide to
libelous, malicious, scurrilous, or abusive matter supplied by notoriety-seeking
persons who need buy only a single share of stock for the purpose" ;251 and that
it would increase the length of the proxy statement, burden corporations with
increased cost (at a time of war), and burden shareholders with too much
information.2 52 Some went as far
as to suggest that "shareholder participation
2 53
was not really necessary at all."
Those businesses and business groups who were willing to support the
rule wanted to limit the scope of shareholder participation. They suggested
imposing restrictions that would permit only shareholders who owned a certain
amount of stock to include their proposals and limit the number of proposals
that any shareholder could submit.2 54 They further suggested that shareholder
244. Nicholas, supra note 221, at 118.
245. ld.at 119.
246. Id. at 118-26.
247. Id. at 125. It is also important to note that proponents of shareholder democracy
feared that "if shareholders were only permitted to nominate one director for each available
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guarantee election of management nominees. Id.
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proposals be limited to "proper subjects for shareholder action under state law,
and not address the ordinary business activities under the purview of
management. 2 55 The final rule, perhaps reflecting the New Dealers' own
ambivalence about shareholder democracy, endorsed the suggested
256
It required management to include shareholder proposals in its
limitation.
these proposals were "proper subjects for action
proxy solicitation only when
25 7
by the security holders.
While the SEC was willing to limit the application of the rule, it was not
willing to omit it. Proclaiming that it did not see how the shareholder proposal
rule would burden corporations (even in times of war), the SEC included the
shareholder proposal rule in its December 1942 release. 258 Chairman Purcell
and his team were keen on expanding the rights of shareholders, especially the
small individual shareholder or, as they described her, the owner.259 For one
thing, Purcell explained that:
The rules are based on the fact that stockholders are the owners of their
corporations and the stockholders' meetings are their meetings, and not the
management's meetings. Anybody who approaches a stockholder and asks
him for his proxy, must recognize that he is asking the stockholder to
appoint him as the stockholder's agent. He should give the stockholder
and must recognize his rights as the owner of the
accurate information
260
corporation.
There was little public pressure to enact the rule, but the SEC staff
persisted. If early New Deal programs sought to empower organized groups
such as labor unions, the shareholder proposal rule aimed at empowering small,
disorganized shareholders in order to allow them to fight concentrated
managerial power. 6' It was not meant to interfere with managerial power, but
to protect stockholders who were not connected with the management.26 2 In
1954, Milton Freeman, the draftsman of the shareholder proposal rule,
explained that he and his colleagues envisioned the small shareholder who
treated her investment as a long-term investment as the principle beneficiary of
the rule. Freeman noted that they were not concerned about holders of larger
blocks of shares because they either had control or were able to launch a proxy
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at 129.
Nicholas, supra note 221, at 129.
Id.
Id. at 128-32.
Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019, supra note 53, at 183.
Id.
Nicholas, supra note 221, at 153-54.
Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019, supra note 53, at 35.
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fight if they wanted to gain control.2 63 While the 1934 Act was designed to
protect all individual shareholders, the shareholder proposal rule focused on
those most vulnerable among the shareholders. In a world growing rapidly
concerned about totalitarianism, Purcell and his team wanted to protect the
individual shareholder against management and the control group. In the
process, they turned away from Berle's and Ripley's understanding of the
nature of collective ownership to the earlier vision of the shareholder as an
individual owner.
Guaranteeing the individual shareholder's right to participate was a
means of protecting the American ideal of democracy. The New Dealers
wanted to recreate the traditional annual meeting, reminiscent, perhaps, of the
democratic town meeting. They wanted to create a solid corporate
foundation for the ideal of American democracy. Interestingly, when
members of Congress raised questions about shareholder proposals
supporting communism during the hearings concerning the rules, Purcell
made clear that such proposals were outside the scope of the rule. 264 Frank
Emerson and Franklin Latcham, the avid 1950s advocates of shareholder
democracy, beautifully captured the New Dealers' aspirations when they
wrote:
Shareholder democracy holds promise of rekindling on a broader basis
the spirit of individual inquiry and free discussion through use ofthe SEC
provisions for security holder communication and proposals for corporate
action. This, too, is salutary265in that it affords a haven for human growth
in an awesome atomic age.
Robert Healy (a former FTC counsel) was the only commissioner who
voted against the adoption of the shareholder proposal rule; he believed that
the rule reached beyond the remedy of disclosure and thus beyond the scope
of the SEC's authority. 266 The shareholder proposal rule became effective
January i5, 1943.267 In 1945, after recounting the mid-1920s attempts to
empower shareholders, a commentator noted that with the enactment of the

263. Milton V. Freeman, An Estimate ofthe PracticalConsequencesofthe Stockholder's
ProposalRule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 549, 552 (1956-1957).
264. Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019, supra note 53, at 163.
265. FRANK D. EMERSON & FRANKLIN C. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY: A
BROADER OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATIONS 10 (1954).
266. Nicholas, supra note 221, at 132.
267. George D. Homstein, A New Form For Shareholders, 45 COLuM. L. REv. 35, 48
(1945).
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shareholder proposal rule, shareholder organization, while still theoretical,
had become at least possible.268
The battle for shareholder democracy did not end with the adoption of
the December 1942 rules. Business groups were able to interest Congress in
the argument that the SEC had reached beyond its statutory power to regulate
disclosure in adopting the shareholder proposal rule. Congressional hearings
ensued, during which the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee
269
was able to express its displeasure over the rule, but not to eliminate it.
Purcell was able to convince members of Congress that by permitting
communication between shareholders, the shareholder proposal rule was, for
the most part, a disclosure rule. It only required management to include
proposals it knew in advance a shareholder intended to propose at the
270
meeting.
Subsequent developments, however, were devastating to the idea of
shareholder democracy as Purcell and his colleagues conceived of it.
Beginning shortly after its adoption and continuing well into the 1980s, the
shareholder proposal rule, especially the definition of proper subjects and the
qualification of the submitting shareholders, has gone through many cycles of
interpretation and amendments by the SEC and the courts. These changes
corresponded to, and helped shape, changing visions of the shareholder's role
in large corporations. As we will see, the conception of shareholder
democracy was gradually reduced from participation to voting. Within a few
decades, all that was left of the 1942 attempt to create a participatory, or
deliberative, corporate democracy (as a means of constraining management
power) was the right of individual shareholders to elect directors (and,
alternatively, sell their shares).

268.

Id. On the shareholder proposal rule, see generally Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting

CorporateDemocracy andSocial Responsibility: The Need to Reform the FederalProxy Rules

on ShareholderProposals,50 RUTGERS L. REv. 33 (1997-1998).
269. Nicholas, supra note 221, at 132-45.
270. The Senate Report on the 1934 Act indicated that:
In order that the stockholder may have adequate knowledge as to the manner in
which his interests are being served, it is essential that he be enlightened not only as
to the financial condition of the corporation, but also as to the major questions of
policy, which are decided at stockholders' meetings. Too often proxies are
solicited without explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the matters for
which authority to cast his vote is sought.
S. Rep. No. 73-1455 (1934), cited in David C. Bayne, S.J., The Basic Rationale of Proper
Subject, 34 U. DET. L.J. 575, 587 (1956-57); see also H.R. Rep No. 73-1383, at 5-6 (1934);
HELEN E. BooTH, THE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE: SEC INTERPRETATIONS AND LAWSUITS 1
(Investor Responsibility Research Center) (1987); Nicholas, supra note 221, at 145.
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D. Democracy's Limits

The SEC adopted the first set of amendments to the proxy rules in 1947.271
These amendments formalized the role of the SEC's Division of Corporation
Finance in reviewing shareholder proposals that corporations wanted to omit
from their proxy statements. Before these amendments were adopted, the Third
Circuit, in SEC v. Transamerica,formally established the SEC's authority to
determine which shareholder proposals were "proper subjects., 27 2 The court
accepted the SEC's position that shareholder proposals to change the location
of the annual meeting, to require stockholder ratification of auditors, to require
post-meeting disclosure of changes made to the bylaws, and to request the
board to make a post-meeting report, were all proper subjects.273 According to
the court, "stockholders [were] entitled to employ watchmen to eye the
guardians of their enterprise, the directors." 274 The SEC was granted power to
determine the scope of the shareholders' access to the ballot.275
Even though only 135 shareholder proposals (by 56 different proponents)
were presented between 1943 and 1947,276 the American Society of Corporate
Secretaries (founded in 1946) was keen on discouraging small shareholders
from making proposals at annual meetings.27 7 In 1948, responding to the
Society's fears that shareholder proposals would become a nuisance, the SEC
made additional changes to the proxy rules. It allowed corporations to omit
even "proper subject proposals" in three situations. First, corporations could
omit proposals that were submitted primarily to enforce a personal claim or
redress a personal grievance against the company or its management. Second,
they could omit proposals if management had included a proposal from the
security holder in a proxy solicitation related to the last two annual meetings
and the security holder failed to attend the meeting or to present the proposal
for action at the meeting. Finally, corporations could omit proposals if
substantially the same proposal had been voted on at the last meeting and
received less than 3% of the vote.2 78 Commissioner McConnaughey noted that
271. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 265, at 94.
272. SEC v. Transamerica, 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947).
273. Id.; see also Nicholas, supranote 221, at 164-68 (discussing SEC v. Transamerica).
274. Transamerica, 163 F.2d at 517.
275. Fisch, supra note 229, at 1145.
276. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 265, at 102.
277. Nicholas, supranote 221, at 170. For additional information on the American Society
of Corporate Secretaries (ASCS), see http://www.govemanceprofessionals. org/whatisascs.shtml
(last visited Dec. 13, 2006) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
278. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 265, at 95. On these amendments, see also
Nicholas, supranote 221, at 170-73 and John G. Ledes, A Review of ProperSubject Under the
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these changes "were only designed to eliminate crackpot propositions without
impeding consideration of opposition proposals that have at least debatable
merit and are proper subjects for stockholder's action., 279 No longer interested
in encouraging the small individual shareholder to participate, the SEC aimed
to protect management from its owners' presumed harassment.280
This was also the gist of a more significant amendment that the SEC
adopted in 1952. As if reflecting the vision of shareholder democracy that the
shareholder proposal rule embraced, this amendment focused on internal
corporate hierarchies or, more specifically, the appropriate roles of shareholders
and managers. It codified the SEC's practice of excluding from the scope of
permissible shareholder proposals those primarily "for the purpose of
promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar
causes." 28 ' The SEC did not see these as proper subjects for shareholder action.
At the same time, the justification for the 1952 amendment seemed to follow
the one offered for the 1948 amendments. The 1952 exclusion was predicated
on the assumption that management became vulnerable to the shareholders.2 82
The 1952 amendment followed discussions of a particular stockholder
proposal, which James Peck, a founder of the Congress of Racial Equality,
presented to the Greyhound Corporation in the fall of 1950. Peck wanted to
require management to "consider the advisability of abolishing the segregated
seating system in the South. 283 Peck had presented the proposal earlier, in
March 1950, but it was rejected because it was not filed on time. 284 In March
1951, the SEC advised the Greyhound Corporation that it could omit the
proposal because it involved "matters which are of a general political, social or
economic nature" and thus not a proper subject for action by shareholders.2 85
While the SEC agreed that the proposal seemed relevant to Greyhound's
business, it determined that Peck was not interested in solving a problem of
Proxy Rules, 34 U. DET. L.J. 520, 522-23 (1956-1957).
279. Nicholas, supra note 221, at 172.
280. See, e.g., EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 265, at 45 (explaining that the 1948
amendments were required because "in a few cases management have been badgered by
proposals which apparently were not submitted in good faith, or were submitted for the purpose
of achieving some ulterior personal objective unrelated to the interests of the sound and fair
management of corporate affairs").
281. Id. at 96.
282. As early as 1945, Baldwin Bane, then director of the Division of Corporation Finance,
made clear that proposals pertaining to matters of general political, social, and economic interest
were not proper subjects for shareholder action. Nicholas supra note 221, at 169.
283. Id. at 183.
284. Id.
285. Id.; Peck v. Greyhound Corp., 97 F. Supp. 679, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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relevance solely to the corporation, but in advancing a cause. 286 The 1952
amendment was meant to codify this and similar SEC reactions. Despite
opposition by civil rights groups, like the NAACP and the American Jewish
Congress, the amendment was adopted.28 7
As noted, the 1952 amendment was predicated upon a reversed vision of
corporate hierarchies. Yet, by continuing to see the goal of shareholder
democracy as addressing concerns raised by such hierarchies, the amendment
sustained the legacy of the 1942 shareholder proposal rule. The alternative of
focusing on corporate power, which would have required Greyhound to include
Peck's proposal in its proxy solicitation, was articulated by Berle, also in 1952.
In an article on The Developing Law of Corporate Concentration, Berle
described the corporation as "an arm of the state, held to certain of the
limitations imposed on the state itself by the Bill of Rights requiring [it] to
respect certain individual rights and to assure a measure of equal protection of
the laws within the scope of its power., 288 According to Berle, "the basic rights
of individuals [were to] be... scrupulously protected" against corporations as
"an offset to their necessary organization and power. 2 89 Individual rights were
to be protected 0against corporations, "as they were against the erstwhile
29
political state.,

Neither Berle nor civil rights groups were able to affect the course of
events. The 1952 rule was used not only to prohibit proposals having to do
with corporate power, but also those dealing with corporate hierarchies, such
as
29 1
Wilma Soss's proposals requesting the appointment of women directors.
Even more damaging to the purpose of those who enacted the 1942 rule
were the amendments that the SEC introduced in 1954. Despite the fact that
even when included in corporations' proxy materials, shareholder proposals
never posed a threat to management and, for the most part, were defeated on
the floor,292 the SEC determined to stop the activities of corporate gadflies like

286. Nicholas, supra note 221, at 186.
287. For an extensive discussion of the 1952 amendment and its critics, see id.
at 181-94.
The 1952 amendment also required shareholders to submit proposals "30 days before the time of
the previous year's proxy solicitation instead of 30 days before the time of the previous year's
last meeting." Ledes, supra note 278, at 523.
288. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Developing Law of CorporateConcentration,19 U. C. L.
REv. 639,643 (1952).
289. Id.at 661.
290. Id.
291. Nicholas, supra note 221, at 194.
292. See Benjamin Graham, Foreword, in EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 265, at vi
(offering possible explanations for the relative lack of success).
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Soss and Gilbert.293 In 1934, Congress was concerned that the separation of
ownership from control and the corresponding anonymity of investors made the
control group forget that they were entrusted with other people's savings.
"When men do not know the victims of their aggression they are not always
conscious of their wrongs," the House Report read. 294 In 1947 the Third Circuit

proclaimed that the proxy rules were a means of reminding a corporation's
executives that a "corporation is run for the benefit of its stockholders and not
for that of its managers."2 95 But the 1954 amendments were predicated upon
the "near opposite premise, recorded in the SEC Minutes, that a corporation
should be permitted 'to omit any296
proposal which impinges upon the duties and
functions of the management.' ,,

Generally, shareholder proposals from the 1940s through the 1950s
addressed five issues: shareholders voting rights, matters concerning directors
and officers, communication between managers and shareholders, directors'
and officers' compensation, and the shareholders' property interests.
Proposals addressing shareholders voting rights included proposals to
change the location of the annual meeting, as well as to require cumulative
voting for the election of directors. Proposals dealing with matters concerning
directors and officers included proposals to allow shareholders to nominate
directors using the management's proxy solicitation, to require that independent
directors sit on the board, to mandate that women serve on boards (most of the
latter proposals were introduced by Soss and her Federation of Women
Shareholders), to eliminate staggered boards, and to allow shareholders to
nominate and elect auditors. Proposals dealing with communication between
management and the shareholders required the board to provide to security
holders financial reports throughout the year, and to submit post-meeting
reports to the security holders. Proposals focusing on directors' and officers'
compensation included proposals to change executive compensation (especially
during a down cycle), to impose a ceiling on executive compensation and
employee pension funds, and to reduce executive compensation when
dividends were not distributed.
Finally, proposals dealing with the
shareholders' property interests included proposals mandating the distribution

293. SELIGMAN, supranote 168, at 271.
294. H.R. Rep. No. 73-1383, at 5, 13 (1934), cited in Med. Comm. for Human Rights v.
SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
295. SEC v. Transamerica, 163 F.2d 511, 517 (3rd Cir. 1947).
296. SELIGMAN, supra note 168, at 271 (quoting SEC Minutes, Aug. 7, 1953, Jan. 26, 1954,
Feb. 19, 1954, Mar. 2, 1954, and Mar. 11, 1954).
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of dividends out of existing funds or requiring preemptive rights for security
holders.297
As this short summary should indicate, shareholders did not abuse their
power to introduce proposals. 298 "Today in the world of the corporation,"
David Bayne wrote:
[T]he danger is not that management will be consumed by a roaring lion,
nor is there danger in the foreseeable future that the overweening power of
the uninformed, unorganized and even disorganized shareholder will be a
threat to the cowed, beaten and hapless management. A sensible and
enlightened management should on the other hand welcome the whip of
shareholder complaint, criticism and suggestion, lest they atrophy or grow
soft.299

Still, in 1954, the SEC further limited the scope of permissible shareholder
proposals. The 1954 amendments excluded proposals referring to ordinary
business from the appropriate scope of shareholders action. 300 Corporations
could omit both those proposals having to do with a too general (economic,
political, racial, religious, social) matter and those dealing with a too narrow
issue, that is, ordinary business.30 '
With very little room to act, some commentators suggested that
shareholders focus their proposals (and action in the corporation) on "two areas
of major importance to them... (a) the adequacy of earning results, and (b) the
adequacy of the dividend policy.

' 30 2

In pursuing these goals, shareholders were

also advised to seek help from the "many agencies in the financial community
that could supply such counsel. 30 3 The investment funds, stock exchange
houses, security-analyst groups, and other investment organizations became the
alternative for Berle's, Ripley's, and Douglas's protective organizations.
Furthermore, the 1954 amendments limited the right of the security holder
to make a proposal even when the proposal's subject fit the divide between the
too narrow and the too broad. The amendments allowed corporations to
exclude a proposal that was submitted once within the previous three years if it
297. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 265, at 101-12. On the different kinds of
shareholder proposals, see Lewis D. Gilbert, An IndependentShareholderAppraisal,34 U. DET.
L.J. 558 (1956-1957); Bayne, supra note 270, at 595.
298. See also EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 265, at 117 (noting that "there is no
significant evidence of any abuse of the proposal rule").

299.

Bayne, supranote 270, at 605-06.

300.
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had failed to receive 3% of the vote. 3° If the proposal was submitted twice
within the previous three years, it could be excluded if it had not received 6%
of the vote.30 5 If it was submitted three times, it could be excluded if it had
failed to receive 10% of the vote. 306 The 1954 amendments also required
security holders to notify management of their intent to include a proposal 60
days prior to the date on which the proxy solicitation material had been released
the previous year.307 As proponents of shareholder democracy concluded,
"[o]nly the Gilberts, the Federation of Women Shareholders in American
Business, Inc., and a very few other representative proponents [were] able to
operate effectively under the restrictive 1954 amendments... and even they
[had to] resort to the seemingly devious tactic of30changing
proposals when a 38
6-10% favorable vote [could not] be obtained.
Gilbert, Emerson and Latcham, and Bayne struggled to defend the
shareholder proposal rule against these new tides of opposition. Writing in
1956, Gilbert, who introduced many shareholder proposals, stressed that the
rule promoted "a real people's capitalism." 30 9 "Here," he wrote, was "the
positive answer to communism and the communistic charges of absentee
ownership, not the archaic idea of selling one's stock if dissatisfied with
management. 3 10 In a similar manner, Bayne proclaimed that "the failure of
democracy within the modem American corporation is the failure of democracy
pro tanto in our culture. 3 11 And Emerson and Latcham concluded that "[t]he
failure of proposals to carry or win larger votes is no criteria by which to judge
the proposal rule."312 As they viewed it, the significance of the rule was in
promoting the exchange of stimulating ideas. Sometimes managements that
opposed a certain proposal later adopted its course of action, suggesting that
shareholder proposals could have extra-legal effects. "What is involved,"
Emerson and Latcham concluded, "is basically the right of a minority to

304. SELIGMAN, supranote 168, at 271.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Frank D. Emerson, Some Sociological and Legal Aspects of Institutional and
IndividualParticipationunder the SEC's ShareholderProposalRule, 34 U. DET. L.J. 528,547
(1956-1957).
309. Gilbert, supranote 297, at 573.
310. Id.at573-74.
311. Bayne, supranote 270, at 575.
312. EMERSON & LATCHAM, supra note 265, at 117.
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express itself and have an exchange of ideas-all in a corporate context-but
close to a fundamental freedom."3" 3
But after the 1954 amendments, little was left of the original shareholder
proposal rule. Indeed, it seemed that the only power that shareholders still had,
other than selling their stock, was the power to launch a proxy contest.
Emerson went as far as to suggest that the 1954 amendments encouraged proxy
contests. 314 (Proxy fights were so common in the 1950s, albeit typically
unsuccessful, that an article in Barron's National Business and Financial
Weekly proclaimed 1954 as "the year of battle by proxy.") 315 Instead of seeking
to foster communication and cooperation between individual shareholders and
managers, the 1954 amendments helped pave the way for a new vision of
shareholder democracy. Building on the individualist undertones of the 1940s
shareholder proposal rule, this new vision was predicated on the inevitability of
conflict between management and shareholders as well as on the individual's
ability to self-protect. At least in part, it was sustained by the growing
dominance of institutional investors. Gradually, as we will see, the
shareholder's role as participant and the shareholder's role as investor
converged. By the 1990s, this vision would dominate corporate law.
IV. 1970s-1980s: Markets, Voters, and Convergence
A. DisclosurePartIII: Free and Unregulated
Beginning in the late 1930s and continuing until the mid-1970s,
Keynesian economics gained wide acceptance. Predicated upon the belief that
governments should not choose among competing, individual, visions of the
public good, it helped legitimate a regulatory shift-from "planning" to
"accepting existing consumer preferences" and "manipulating aggregate
demand. 3 16 Both those who criticized the early New Deal as only increasing
the concentration of power in a few hands and those who criticized it as
increasing government power found in the consumer ideology a point of
convergence. The former wanted to expand the regulatory functions of the
administrative state to defend the consumer and promote full production, while
313.

Id.

314. Emerson, supranote 308, at 547.
315. John C. Perham, Revolt of the Stockholder: Proxy Fights Are Breaking out
Everywhere These Days, BARRON'S NAT'L Bus. & FiN. WKLY., Apr. 26, 1954.
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the latter wanted the state only to redress "weaknesses and imbalances in the
private economy without directly confronting the internal workings of
capitalism"-to
"manage the economy without managing the institutions of the
3 17
economy.
In the 1940s, with totalitarianism in Europe, and scholars' growing
concerns about the relationship between statism and tyranny, the compensatory,
fiscal vision of the state, which entailed only limited power, became the more
appealing one. At the same time, the economic boom produced by the war
efforts made the need for regulation less urgent. The economy seemed to do
well without government interference. A vision of a free market, compensated
on rare occasions
by the state's fiscal hand, began to dominate economic
3 18
thought.
The growing academic faith in the power of economic and political
markets to serve (and produce) the common good opened a door for the
introduction of economics into corporate law. Neo-classical economists, who
thus far had focused their theorizing efforts on markets, turned to the
corporation's internal structure. Their new economic theory of the firm offered
a picture of the corporation that fit the market-centered economic policies of the
postwar years. Rather than putting management hierarchies or the need to
constrain corporate power at the center of the corporate paradigm, the new
economic theory of the firm found a way around hierarchical power and its
consequent need for regulation. Drawing on microeconomics, it painted a
picture of the corporation as a nexus of private, contractual relationships. This
cleared the way for egalitarian economic markets to become the relevant focal
point. 319 The corporation was a collection of "disaggregated but interrelated
transactions" among individuals or the convenient fiction of corporate entity in
free and efficient markets.3 2 °
The new theory of the firm supported a shift of focus in scholarly
debates-from questions ofpower, influence, sanctions and legitimacy to issues
of cost reduction and profit maximization. 321 Its proponents reframed the
problem of the modem corporation as the problem of the separation of
ownership from control and sought to demonstrate how capital markets could
317.
318.

Id. at 94, 87-97.
On these developments, see id. at 97-121; SANDEL, supranote 29, at 250-73; ALAN
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eliminate the concerns about efficiency associated with this separation.3 22 The
individual shareholder's ability freely to act in economic markets,
supplemented only by her right to elect her agents, was the cornerstone of their
theory of corporate democracy.
Take, for example, Henry Manne. Writing in 1961 he offered a harsh
critique of earlier attempts to protect the small, individual investor.32 3 Manne
dismissed the mid-i 920s attempts to protect shareholders as having nothing to
do with shareholder democracy. According to Manne, Berle (and Means)
sacrificed the individual shareholder for the benefit of the community. 32 4 Then,
having criticized Berle for never suggesting ways to improve the shareholders'
franchise (and more broadly for his collectivist approach), Manne pronounced
the 1940s theories of corporate democracy "the most effective of the modem
philosophies of large corporations. 3 25 They were most effective because, as
Manne saw it, they were completely negligible.
Focusing on Gilbert's efforts to promote shareholders' interests, Manne
concluded that, in general, shareholders were not interested in business
problems. Rather, they were more concerned with "establishing a system in
which shareholders can have a more effective voice on [important corporate
matters] if they wish."3 26 In fact, as Manne pointedly put it:
To the extent that pure corporate democracy in the sense of the New
England town meeting is deemed to be desirable, Gilbert has had a
beneficial influence. Beyond that he is probably of so little consequence
that his affirmative proposals need not be considered in depth at all. The
sort of basic changes which Gilbert, his brother and occasionally one or two
dedication for which most
others, seem to advocate would require
327 a kind of
shareholders have shown little taste.
Emerson and Latcham received no better treatment. They were, Manne
wrote, "almost unreasonably enthusiastic about the desirability of this
[shareholder proposal] rule. 3 28 Exploiting one of Emerson's and Latcham's
arguments that the rule "held the greatest promise for progress towards
shareholder democracy and the salvation of our corporate enterprise system,"
Manne sarcastically noted that "[e]xperience to date with the rule would certainly
322.
323.
(1961).
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
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Henry G. Manne, Current Views on the "Modern Corporation,"38 U. DET. L.J. 559
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make one less than sanguine about the
salvation of our corporate system if it
3 29
depend[ed] on utilization of the rule.
It is hard, if not impossible, to challenge Manne's conclusion that the
shareholder proposal rule did not result in a thriving shareholder democracy.
Even Freeman, the draftsman of the rule, conceded that:
[T]he average smaller shareholder... buys his stocks either with a view to
dividend return on his investment or more frequently.., with a view to
capital appreciation .... [M]ost shareholders hold their shares as long as
they continue to have confidence in the future of the company and the
prospects of increased market values and dividends. When they lose this
confidence they sell their securities. While they hold their securities such
shareholders concern themselves almost exclusively with market prices,
earnings, dividends and future earnings and dividend prospects. They do not
attend shareholders meetings. They normally vote proxies on the
management's suggestion. Very few of them read proxy statements. And
330
almost none of them makes proposals for action at shareholders meetings.
Despite such an assessment, Freeman and other proponents of shareholder
democracy believed it was a means to an end. They believed that protecting the
small individual shareholder who was committed to her investment for the long
term would help constrain management's potential abuses of power. Moreover,
along with many Progressives and New Dealers, they believed that political and
economic democracy was predicated upon the protection of the most vulnerable.
Manne's goals and ideals were different. He rejected all theories of
shareholder democracy (including the 1960s focus on institutional investors), as
well as all theorizing about the corporation, with the exception of economic
theorizing. According to Manne, the solution to the problem of the modem
corporation was the recognition that there was no problem at all. Only when the
corporation was viewed as a hierarchical entity with social, political, and
economic power did corporate power become a problem. Once corporations were
seen as aggregations of individuals seeking to maximize their profits, concerns
about corporate power and hierarchies disappeared.3 3'
Once the corporation was turned into an aggregation of individuals keen on
maximizing their profits, the only task left for shareholders was to ensure that
such profit maximization occurred. In an article on the significance of the
shareholder's voting rights and, more important, the shareholder's ability to sell
her right (or her share), Manne articulated this new conception of shareholder
democracy. The shareholders' role was to elect directors who would maximize
329.
330.
331.

Manne, supra note 323, at 566.
Freeman, supra note 263, at 553.
Manne, supranote 323, at 583-88.

1564

63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1503 (2006)

their profits. To achieve this goal, they needed information, which was costly.
But if shareholders were attuned to the market and sold their shares to those who
had both the information and the ability to elect directors (for example, those
seeking to gain control over the entity), they would be able to maximize their
profits without incurring additional information costs.332 As Manne concluded:
The market for votes, therefore serves two critical functions. It gives the
advantage of someone else's information-gathering to all the shareholders
willing to sell. It also causes votes to move into the hands of those
shareholders to whom the vote itself is most valuable, that is, those who know
how to use it most profitably. The value of the vote, as opposed to the value
of voting the shares one way rather than another, rests with those who have
the most reliable information. Without the market, many small shareholders
could not have any idea of what the vote itself was actually worth to them.
Thus, the corporate system of allowing the sale of votes guarantees an
electorate that is both relatively self-informed and more intensely interested in
the outcome of the election than would be the case if votes were not
transferable. And it does this with no harm to the interests of anyone
associated with or affected by the corporation.333
The shareholders' power was not their voting but their selling power.334 As
Manne and many others saw it, there was no need to guarantee that management
communicated with shareholders. Gone also was the need to guarantee that
shareholders communicated with management. Power and hierarchy disappeared,
and the individual shareholder gained the ability to self-protect, mostly by selling
her interest in the corporation. Whether a shareholder chose to act as investor or
as participant, the market became the locus of corporate democracy.
B. Social Responsibility Proposals: The FinalCrusade
Proponents of the shareholder proposal rule did not let go without a fight.
In the 1970s, after more than twenty years in which the SEC had barred almost
all social proposals,33 5 organized efforts to force corporations to act in socially
responsible ways brought about a new interest in Rule 14a-8.

332. Henry G. Manne, Some TheoreticalAspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honorof
AdolfA. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1427 (1964).
333. Id. at 1444.
334. Cf Dale A. Oesterle and Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder
Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L. REv. 485,487-88 (1994) (arguing that in the 1970s and 1980s many
scholars believed that the threat of hostile takeovers increased the shareholders' power).
335. Nicholas, supranote 221, at 281.
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The first such effort was undertaken by the Project on Corporate
Responsibility (The Project), which owned twelve shares of stock of General
Motors (GM).336 The Project, which was formed by four lawyers who were
able to enlist Ralph Nader's support, asked GM's management to include nine
proposals in the company's proxy solicitation.337 These proposals addressed
product quality and safety, working conditions, environmental protection, and
affirmative action (in selecting dealers).3 38 Ultimately, The Project was able to
bring two proposals before the shareholders: one seeking an increase in the
size of the board, and the other seeking to "improve the company's social
impact" by creating a "General Motors Shareholders Committee for Corporate
Responsibility," "comprised of... persons appointed by General Motors, the
United Auto Workers, and Campaign GM. 3 39 Although neither proposal
gained sufficient votes (not even the 3% required for reintroduction the
following year), their inclusion in the company's proxy constituted a major
victory for advocates of social cause proposals.340
Three months after the SEC sanctioned the inclusion of the social
responsibility proposal in GM's proxy solicitation, Senator Edmund Muskie
introduced the Corporate Participation Bill which sought to bar, inter alia,
"exclusion of shareholder proposals 'on the ground that such proposal may
unless the matter
involve economic, political, racial, religious, or similar issues,
3 41
or action proposed is not within the control of the issuer.0'
Shortly thereafter, the D.C. Circuit handed down its decision in Medical
Committee for Human Rights v. SEC (1970),342 reiterating the Third Circuit's
1947 statement: "A corporation is run for the benefit of the stockholders and
not for that of its managers. 3 43 The decision focused on the SEC's letter of
"no action" with respect to a proposal that the Medical Committee (as an
owner of a few shares) wanted the board of the Dow Chemical Company to
include in its proxy materials. 344 The proposal requested the board "to adopt
a resolution setting forth an amendment to the Composite Certificate of
336. See id. at 285 (describing how the Project on Corporate Responsibility initiated
"Campaign GM").
337. Id. at 286-87.
338. Id. at 285-87.
339. Id. at 286-87.
340. Nicholas, supranote 221, at 285-90, 304.
341. SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 410 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Nicholas, supranote 221, at 292-93.
342. Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
343. Id.at 681.
344. Id.at 661-63.
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Incorporation... that napalm [should] not be sold to any buyer unless that
buyer [gave] reasonable assurance that the substance [would] not be used on or
against human beings. 3 45 The board thought the proposal could be omitted,
and the SEC announced that it would take no action on the matter. 346 The D.C.
Circuit saw things differently and remanded the case to the SEC for
reconsideration.3 47 In a pointed comment about the shareholders' role in the
corporation, Judge Tamm wrote:
It could scarcely be argued that management is more qualified or more
entitled to make these kinds of decisions than the shareholders who are the
true beneficial owners of the corporation; and it seems equally implausible
that an application of the proxy rules which permitted such a result could be
harmonized with the philosophy of corporate democracy which Congress
embodied in section 14(a) ....
On appeal, the Supreme Court declared that the case was moot because the
company had included the proposal in a previous year and it failed to receive
3% of the votes.34 9 In dissent, Justice Douglas, referring, among other things,
to the Corporate Participation Bill, wrote:
The modem super-corporations, of which Dow is one, wield immense,
virtually unchecked, power. Some say that they are "private governments,"
whose decisions affect the lives of us all. The philosophy of our times, I
think, requires that such enterprises be held to a higher standard than that of
the "morals of the marketplace" which exalts a single-minded, myopic
determination to maximize profits as the traditional be-all and end-all of
corporate concern. The "public interest in having the legality
of the
35
practices settled, militates against a mootness conclusion. 0
The pressure for change was mounting, sustained in part by the social
unrest regarding the Vietnam War as well as the civil rights movement that
swept the country. Then, in September of 1972, the SEC amended Rule 14a-8
to open the door, albeit not widely, for social purpose shareholder proposals. It
substituted for the provision allowing exclusion of proposals intent on
"promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar
causes" a provision allowing omission only if the proposal was "not
significantly related to the business of the issuer or is not within the control of
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Id. at 662.
Id. at 663.
Med. Comm.for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 682.
Id. at 681-82.
SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 406 (1972).
Id. at 409-10 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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'
(Notice that this rule would have allowed Dow to exclude the
the issuer."351
Medical Committee's proposal.) 35 2 In November of 1972, the SEC also made
public its no-action letters, thus providing important information about the
administration of the Rule to those interested in promoting social purpose
proposals.353
In the following decade, as the country witnessed a wide-range of protests,
social responsibility proposals became a "full-fledged phenomenon," leading
the U.S. Senate to probe how to "make corporations more accountable to their
stockholders and to the public." 35 4 Church groups and institutional investors
replaced the earlier "scattered shareholder campaigns" (such as the Medical
Committee's campaign against Dow or even the influential Campaign GM).355
The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which was established in
1972 by a group of institutional investors who were trying to assess how to vote
coming
on these new resolutions, "counted 38 social responsibility resolutions
''
to votes in 1973, 72 in 1974, 83 in 1975, and 133 in 1976. 356
Church groups' efforts focused on equal employment opportunities, plant
closing, racism in South Africa, "activities in countries with controversial
human rights records, energy conservation, nuclear power and nuclear
weapons," as well military production.35 7 Church groups sponsored proposals
to postpone mining in Puerto Rico because of environmental concerns as well
as concerns about the health and well-being of the people of Puerto Rico. They
also introduced proposals to withdraw operations from South Africa, and
proposals58 to reform American manufacturers' sales practices of infant
3
formula.
Other groups followed suit. In 1976, the American Jewish Congress
turned to shareholder proposals in its campaign against the Arab nations'

351. Nicholas, supranote 221, at 293. On social responsibility proposals in the 1950s and
1960s and the SEC's response, see also Fisch, supra note 229, at 1152-55.
352. SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 410 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
353. Nicholas, supra note 221, at 298-99.
354. The Role ofthe Shareholder in the Corporate World: Hearing on S.521-4 Before the
Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights andRemedies ofthe S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong. 2 (1977) [hereinafter The Role of the Shareholder in the Corporate World]
(Statements by Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum, Chairman of the Subcommittee).
355. BooTH, supra note 270, at 3.
356. Id.
357. LAUREN TALNER, THE ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 47 (Investor Responsibility
Research Center) (1983).
358. Id. at 30-32, 47.
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boycott of Israel.359 In the early 1980s antinuclear activists filed many
proposals about the use of nuclear power.360 In 1983, Action on Smoking and
Health filed thirty-seven resolutions on smoking in airports and airplanes, while
the American Jewish Congress organized "a major campaign to expose
361
lobbying by companies in support of sales ofAwacs planes to Saudi Arabia.
As to institutional investors, in 1987, the New York State Common
Retirement Fund and TIAA-CREF engaged "campaigns to get companies to
withdraw from South Africa, and New York City funds have stepped up their
own South Africa divestment campaigns. 3 62 Also in 1987, CREF, the
carpenters' union, and the public pension funds of California and Wisconsin
363
introduced a series of resolutions "against antitakeover poison pill measures."
Proponents of shareholder democracy celebrated the increased activity.
But the 1970s and 1980s vision of the shareholder's role in the corporation was
very different from the one endorsed in earlier decades. While in 1983 the
IRRC reported an increasing number of shareholder proposals, for the most
part, advocacy groups and institutional investors had displaced the vulnerable
364
individual shareholder as the focal point for legal and economic analysis.
Clearly, the participation of institutional investors helped bring about
important changes. In 1982, Thomas Edwards, chairman of TIAA-CREF,
commented that while institutional investors could not "out-vote
management.., even the smallest institutional investors have improved the
acoustics for change, whether management admits it or not. 3 65 Yet, certain
institutional investors like mutual funds were more likely to vote with
management against shareholder proposals. 366 More important, by shifting
their attention to institutions, scholars and reformers helped eradicate the
potential vulnerability of the individual shareholder from the academic
imagination and with it the possibility of shareholder participation independent
of financial incentives.
As if reflecting the real or practical constraints on shareholder
participation, a Bill of Rights for Investors, which Stanley Sporkin described at
the 1977 Annual Meeting of the Society of American Business and Economic
Writers, included ten fundamental rights: the right to disclosure, the right to be
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

BOOTH,supranote 270, at iv.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
TALNER, supra note 357, at 46-48.
Id. at 48.
Nicholas, supra note 221, at 314.
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represented by the board, the right to have management acting honestly, the
right to be treated fairly, the right to assurance that management will not misuse
its position, the right to have corporate professionals act responsibly and with
accountability, the right to seek redress in the federal system for a violation of
these rights, the right to be protected by the SEC, the right to be protected by a
self-regulatory organization, and the right to "expect and depend upon an able,
effective and independent financial press." 367 The right of participation was not
mentioned.
Moreover, concerns about the rising numbers of shareholder proposals led
the SEC to put additional hurdles before the shareholder-participant. In 1983,
for the first time in the rule's history, the SEC imposed "shareholder
qualification standards. 3 68 The 1983 amendments required that a proponent of
a shareholder proposal owned "at least one percent or $1,000, whichever is less,
of securities eligible to be voted at the meeting."3 69 The proponent had to "have
owned those securities for at least one year prior to the meeting, and continue to
own them through the day on which the meeting is held., 370 These
amendments
further restricted all shareholders "to one 14a-8 proposal per
3 71
meeting.
After a decade of agitation against shareholder proposals, the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries and other corporations finally had the upper
hand.372 The SEC had embraced the Society's articulated concerns, albeit
unsupported by statistical data, about "abusive shareholders who purchased
small amounts of stock from several companies as a means of buying a ticket to
annual meetings, especially social activist shareholders."3 73 Interestingly, "the
Staff Report on Corporate Accountability found that there was no correlation
between the amount of stock a proponent owned and the level of support a
shareholder proposal received at an annual meeting. 3 74
Preventing
shareholders' abuse could have been achieved by a more narrowly tailored
exclusionary rule, focusing, for example, only on the duration of the
investment. Moreover, the new amendments made it sufficiently more difficult
for the shareholder to gain access to the proxy machine by changing the "voting
367.
368.

The Role of the Shareholderin the Corporate World, supra note 354, at 92-94.
Ryan, supranote 17, at 115.

369. Id. (citations omitted).
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Nicholas, supra note 221, at 364-66.
373. Virginia J. Harnisch, Rule l4a-8Afler Reagan: Does It ProtectSocialResponsibility
ShareholderProposals?,6 J.L. & POL. 415, 436-37 (1989-90).
374. Nicholas, supranote 221, at 365.
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percentages for resubmission" of proposals from 3% to 5% for the first
resubmission, and from 6% to 8% for the second.3 75 In this context, requesting
shareholders to have a particular equity interest seems to suggest that the SEC
wanted to limit the individual shareholder's access. Even AT&T commented
that it did not "seem sensible to exclude a long-time shareholder interested in
the corporation from participating in the proposal process because his
shareholding is too small. 376
In qualifying shareholders according to their equity interest, the SEC also
emphasized the vision of the shareholder as owner. Proponents of the
shareholder proposal rule had often described shareholders as owners, but they
did so in order to stress the vulnerability and different goals of the small
shareholder. In turn, the 1983 rules were predicated upon the assumption that,
as owners, all shareholders-large and small, institutional and individualshared the common goal of maximizing their profits. Their participation in
corporate affairs was to be limited to achieving this goal. In fact, it seems that
the SEC came to Manne's conclusion. For the most part, it assumed that
shareholders would prefer to sell their stock than to participate in corporate
affairs. The vision of the shareholder as participant converged with the view of
the shareholder as investor to recreate the universal shareholder-an owner in
search of profits.
Other 1983 amendments helped sustain this market-based image of the
relationship between shareholders, managers, and the corporation. For one
thing, the SEC changed the rule allowing omission of proposals that were not
significantly related to the issuer's business. 37 7 It defined "not significantly
related" as accounting for "less than five percent of the issuer's total
assets... and for less than five percent of its net earnings and gross sales for
the most recent fiscal year. 3 78 In fact, the SEC was so obsessed with economic
markets that in the course of preparing the amendments it went as far as to
challenge the79necessity of"a federal regulatory scheme protecting shareholder's
3
proposals.

375. Harnisch, supra note 373, at 439.
376. Id. at 437 n. 132; see also Nicholas, supra note 221, at 367 (noting that "[a]fter 1983,
more wealthy individuals and institutional stockholders had a higher level of democracy than
those who owned less than $1,000 in company stock, or had recently purchased any amount of
stock").
377. Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to
Proposals by Security Holders, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 (Aug. 23, 1983) (codified as 17 C.F.R. pt.
240).
378. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2006).
379. Harnisch, supra note 373, at 433-34.
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In the year following the amendment, "42% fewer proposals were
recorded.380 The numbers rebounded by 1987,3 1 but in the decade that
followed, shareholder social purpose proposals were displaced as the focus of
debates about shareholder democracy and the role of the individual shareholder.
While social purpose proposals (on issues such as plant closing, environmental
protection, apartheid, or employment discrimination) 382 continued to be
captured the attention of shareholders,
submitted, corporate governance 3issues
83
investors.
institutional
especially
Indeed, by the 1980s, most U.S. firms had large shareholders, typically
institutional investors or the initial owners (and their families).38 4 Many
scholars came to accept that the individual shareholder would remain rationally
apathetic and passive, 38 5 but trusted these large shareholders to take a more
active role in monitoring corporate management. Institutional investors seemed
more prone to communicate with managers, engage in proxy contests (or
threaten them),386 and submit shareholder proposals.387 Although such
380. Id. at 440.
381. Nicholas, supra note 221, at 387-88.
382. For a detailed discussion of these proposals, see generally Lazaroff, supra note 268.
383. For analyses of trends in shareholder proposals, see Alan R. Palmiter, The
Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879,
883-84 (1994); Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New
Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, Vanderbilt L. &
Econ. Research Paper No. 05-30, available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?
abstract id=868652.
384. Gerald F. Davis & Tracy A. Thompson,A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate
Control, 39 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 141, 154 (1994); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large
Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. EcoN. 461 (1986). Shleifer and Vishny noted
that in "a sample of 456 of the Fortune 500 firms, 354 have at least one shareholder owning at
least 5 percent of the firm.... The average holding of the largest shareholder among the 456
firms is 15.4 percent." Id.They further noted that a large number of these shareholders are
"families represented on boards of directors (149 cases).., pension and profit-sharing plans (90
cases).., financial firms such as banks, insurance companies, or investment funds (117
cases)... [and] firms and family holding companies with large stakes who do not have board
seats (100 cases)." Id. at 462.
385. See generally J.A.C. Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes: Reflections on
Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 183, 184-86 (1979-1980).
386. See generally David A. Butz, How Do Large Minority Shareholders Wield Control?,
15 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 291 (1994).
387. See, e.g., Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer, & Joseph Zechner, Large Shareholder
Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1097-98 (1994)
(arguing that institutional investors had become more active). But see John M. Bizjak &
Christopher J.Marquette, Are Shareholder Proposals All Bark and No Bite? Evidence from
Shareholder Resolutions to Rescind Poison Pills, 33 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 499,500
(1998) (concluding that, contrary to other studies of shareholder activism, their findings did not
suggest that individual shareholder proposals received less support than proposals submitted by
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expectations were not necessarily fulfilled-most institutional investors turned
out to be less interested in spending money and effort on monitoring
management 38-institutional investors such as public pension funds and labor
organizations helped shift the focus of debates from social issues to corporate
governance, specifically management's anti-takeover tactics or compensation
packages. 8 9 More recently, certain institutional investors have supported calls
to improve shareholders' access to the ballot or to the proxy machine.390
In such an atmosphere, corporate democracy became strictly representative
democracy; the rhetoric of shareholder democracy was rapidly associated not
with shareholder participation but with the investors' twin rights of voice and
exit. 39 1 But, as the following section concludes, in the 1980s and 1990s the
Delaware courts did their best to render even this limited set of rights
ineffective. The shareholder representative democracy was a market
democracy. Shareholder participation independent of market demands was not
encouraged. The individual shareholder had disappeared.
C. Convergence: Exit, Voice, andLegitimacy
The Reagan years helped eradicate the vision of the social welfare state
and replace it with an image of the deregulatory state. In the corporate world,
very little, if anything, was left of the early twentieth century ideal of
participatory shareholder democracy. With the elimination of any other
alternative to influence corporate management, shareholders were supposed to
exercise their (market) rights of exit and voice. But in the Delaware courts
these rights were often inconsequential.
Take, for example, the right to exit. A decade of hostile takeovers
gradually eroded the shareholders' right to exit (which Manne celebrated
twenty years earlier). In a series of cases beginning in the mid-1980s and
culminating in the mid-1990s, the Delaware Court held that in response to
institutional investors).
388. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The CaseforLimitedShareholderVoting Rights, 53
UCLA L. REv. 601, 629-30 (2006) (noting that although institutional investors had the ability
for an active role in corporate governance, by the late 1990s most did not make efforts to
monitor management, conduct proxy solicitations, put forward shareholder proposals, seek to
elect representatives on the boards, or coordinate their activities).
389. Nicholas, supra note 221, at 429, 456.
390. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
391. On the relevance of exit and voice to organizations and political governments, see
generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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hostile bidders, management could seriously encumber the shareholders' ability
to sell their votes. As Justice Horsey put it in Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time, Inc.:
Delaware law confers the management of the corporate enterprise to the
stockholders' duly elected board representatives .... That [fiduciary duty
to manage a corporate enterprise] may not be delegated to the stockholders.
Directors are not obligated to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate
plan for a short-term shareholder
profit unless there is clearly no basis to
392
sustain the corporate strategy.
Six years later, in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., the court, while
nodding to the concept of shareholder democracy, empowered directors to fight
all-cash, all-shares premium tender offers and, for all practical purposes,
prevent shareholders from exercising their right to exit. 3 93 As long as a proxy
contest was a possibility, even if a remote one, the court announced in Unitrin,
the shareholders' right to exit remained viable.394
As to the right to vote, Chancellor Allen's decision in Blasius Industries,
395
Inc. v. Atlas Corp. seemed to encapsulate its meaning in the late 1980s.
Blasius involved a conflict between Atlas's board and Atlas's largest
shareholder, Blasius. In an attempt to prevent or at least delay Blasius from
placing a majority of new directors on the board, Atlas's board increased its
size by two and filled the newly created directorships. 396 Allen's analysis began
by reiterating the rule adopted in the seminal takeover case, Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum CO. 39 7 As Allen explained,
A board may take certain steps ... that have the effect of defeating a
threatened change in corporate control, when those steps are taken
advisedly, in good faith pursuit of a corporate interest, and are reasonable
in relation to a threat to legitimate corporate interests posed by the
proposed change in control.39
But, Allen went on:

392. Paramount Commc'n, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989).
393. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
394. Id. at 1382-83. For Manne's critique of attempts to interfere with the shareholders'
right to exit in these situations, see Henry G. Manne, Cash Tender Offersfor Shares-A Reply
to ChairmanCohen, 16 DuKE L.J. 231 (1967); Henry G. Manne, In Defense of the Corporate
Coup, 11 N. Ky. L. REv. 513 (1984).
395. Blasius Indus. Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 1988).
396. Id. at 652-56.
397. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Comp., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
398. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
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[T]he ordinary considerations to which the business judgment rule
originally responded are simply not present in the shareholder voting
context.... [A] decision by the board to act for the primary purpose of
preventing the effectiveness of a shareholder vote inevitably involves the
question who, as between the principal and the agent,
399 has authority with
respect to a matter of internal corporate governance.

On its face Blasius endorsed a strong conception of shareholder
democracy, according to which directors could not interfere with the
shareholder franchise, regardless of good faith. But a closer reading reveals the
limits of Chancellor Allen's conclusion. For Allen, as it has been for many
writers on the subject in the 1980s and 1990s, shareholders were owners and
directors were their agents. As owners, shareholders had a right to elect (or
select) their agents-the directors, who, incidentally, were no longer expected
to manage the corporation, only to monitor the executives' actions. 400 As
agents, directors were obligated to act in the best interests of their principals.
But, while such obligation might seem to empower shareholders, in reality the
agency rhetoric tremendously limited the shareholders' ability to participate in
corporate affairs. As owners and agents, shareholders and managers were no
longer in a hierarchical relationship. Power and hierarchy disappeared, and in
their place the court envisioned contractual arrangements between shareholders,
as owners, and managers, as agents. All that was left of the shareholder right to
participate was her right to vote.
In the mid-1920s, Ripley and Berle explained that without recognizing
power and hierarchy, the shareholders' right to vote was meaningless. But in
Delaware during the 1980s things were different. Writing in 1988, Chancellor
Allen defined the "shareholder franchise" as "the ideological underpinning
upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests., 40 1 If the shareholder
investor could sell her stock, the shareholder participant could vote to replace
incumbent directors. Admitting, with a nod to Berle, that the shareholders'
vote had often been dismissed "as a vestige or a ritual of little practical
importance,, 40 2 Allen suggested that institutional investors were in the right
place to correct the situation-"to make the stockholder vote a less predictable
40 3
affair than it has been.,
399. Id. at 659-60.
400. On the development of the monitoring board, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble
with Boards (The George Washington Univ. Law School Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper No. 159, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=801308.
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Other scholars have explored how the Delaware courts have balanced the
power of shareholders and directors. 404 For purposes of this Article, it is more
important critically to read Chancellor Allen's statement about the shareholder
vote as reflecting the conclusion of a long transformation. Allen did not
suggest that the vote was meaningful. Rather, for Allen, as it was for Manne in
the 1960s, the shareholder's role in the corporate endeavor was to legitimate
management's exercise of corporate power. While Manne offered individual
shareholders the illusory power of exit (especially in light of the Delaware
Court's later endorsement of anti-takeover tactics), Allen provided them with
an illusory right to vote. The shareholders' voting rights were no longer seen as
a means of shareholder empowerment but as a means of legitimating
management's exercise of power. As Allen put it, whether the vote was "seen
functionally as an unimportant formalism, or as an important tool of discipline,"
it was a means of legitimating the exercise of managerial power. 40 5 It
"legitimate[d] the exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast
40 6
aggregations of property that they [did] not own.,
Like Manne, Allen believed that the market would tame corporate
management. Accordingly, the shareholders' rights of exit and vote as a means
of influencing corporate governance were mostly symbolic. Institutional
investors might be able to use them effectively but their ability to do so
reflected their market power. In turn, the individual shareholder, who was left
with no role to play in the public corporation, was best advised to focus her
attention on profit maximization typically through portfolio diversification.
The individual shareholder was an investor with little, if any, power. Individual
shareholder participation in corporate affairs became a relic of years past. The
rhetoric of legitimation was an apology for the status quo.
The power of courts, scholars, and legal theory is limited. But as this
Article demonstrates, ideas are not only shaped by reality, they also help
influence it. While we seem to witness more active shareholder participation
today, the conception of shareholder democracy that grounded Manne's and
Allen's positions remains with us. Even if management pays more attention to
the shareholders, especially to institutional investors (and, more recently, hedge
funds), adopts better codes of practice, and responds to the demands of social
activists, these are not signs that individual shareholders are gaining a more
meaningful voice in corporations' decision-making processes. Corporations,
the control group, and managers are no less in control today than they were a
404.
405.
406.
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century ago. Mandatory disclosure requirements have helped eliminate certain
market manipulations but have allowed others to survive. Institutional
investors have become much like the controlling shareholders of the early
twentieth century. Most important, shareholder activism and management's
response to it are motivated almost exclusively by financial incentives. Indeed,
we no longer have a substantive concept of shareholder democracy independent
of market demands.
On this background, recent calls to improve shareholders' access to the
ballot or to the proxy machine, as well as corporate board decisions allowing
them to do so, are limited. At best, they are reminiscent of Eustace Seligman's
call in the mid-1920s. The more things change, the more they remain the same.
But we see things differently. Instead of the need to protect minority
shareholders by allowing them to organize or by protecting their individual
right to participate, we see shareholders as sufficiently able to protect
themselves (mostly by investing in mutual funds). Instead of shareholder
organization or the shareholder proposal rule, our discussions focus on the
ability of shareholders, typically institutional investors, to vote and exit. In
short, having destroyed all other alternatives, we are back where we began. Yet
the phenomenon we described at the turn of the twentieth century as a menace
to the individual investor and American democracy more broadly, we describe
today as democracy's sustaining and legitimating force.
V Epilogue
"Democracy is a word to conjure with; and its meaning
is so dim and so
4 °7
equivocal that almost anybody can conjure with it."
In a 1918 article, What do We Mean by Democracy?, philosopher Ralph
Barton Perry noted that "[t]here were three great ideas associated with the
democratic tradition: Equality, Liberty, and Popular Government.'40 8
Although much has been written about democracy since, Perry's comment
offers an interesting tool to assess the history of conversations about the
shareholder's role in the large public corporation. Examined with these ideas
in mind, the story told in this Article is also a story about changing cultural
interpretations of the democratic ideal-from equality, during the Progressive
era, to liberty in the 1940s and 1950s, to popular government beginning in the
407.
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1960s and 1970s. The history of shareholder democracy is indeed a narrative
about different understandings of the American ideal of democracy.
Equality grounded the Progressive ideal of social democracy, or as Perry
put it, "an ideal of social reconstruction. ' ,40 9 Progressives associated equality
and rights with economic and social needs, specifically the rights of individuals
to work, to a livelihood, to social insurance, and to economic independence.
Moreover, for many Progressive scholars, organization was a means of
achieving equality. Rather than leaving individuals to fend for themselves in
the modem industrialized society, Progressives sought to empower them to
organize and collectively pursue their interests. Similar assumptions underlay
Ripley's and Berle's calls for shareholder organization.
With the rise of totalitarianism in Europe, the democratic ideal became
associated with liberty, the idea, as Perry put it, "that in exercising restraints
upon the individual's action the state shall be guided by the principle of
guaranteeing to each individual under the law the largest possible sphere
4 10
within which he may act in accord with his own desires and judgment.
Democracy became "a social organization which celebrated diversity in all
forms and on all levels;" 411 political and legal theorists described protecting the
rights of individuals-their private spheres-as the cornerstone of American
democracy. Cherishing individual rights was a means of guaranteeing the
41 2
resilience of American democracy in the face of ideas such as totalitarianism.
In this intellectual milieu, the individual shareholder's right to participate in
corporate management became the focus of debates about shareholder
democracy.
In the postwar years, process-oriented theories of democracy emphasized
that the strength of American democracy was its political process, which allowed
different groups to interact and trade ends in a free political market. These
theories shifted attention from the ideologies that ground democratic regimes,
such as commitment to equality and liberty, toward the need to protect democratic
institutions-from substance to procedure. As Morton Horwitz put it, "For the
process-oriented school of thought.., political equality was, at most, the only
substantive commitment that democratic theory required. 413 In this atmosphere,
409.
410.
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cultural (and corporate) attention shifted to the concept of popular government,
the idea that "the sovereignty of the state shall be distributed among those whose
interests are at stake; that the government shall periodically secure the consent of
the governed. 4 1 4 Corporate scholars' obsession with the shareholder's right to
vote and exit was justified by reference to this third idea.
The great ideas associated with democracy-equality, liberty, and popular
govemment-helped shape American corporate democracy. But as scholars' and
jurists' goals shifted from constraining corporate power to legitimating it, the
ideas of equality and liberty were gradually eroded. Without them, the idea of
popular government was reduced to meaningless rituals like the annual
shareholder meeting during which the shareholders' presumed agents elected
themselves. Corporations are run like rotten boroughs because in the course of
the twentieth century we never truly tried to guarantee shareholders' equality and
liberty. Using the rhetoric of shareholder democracy as a means of promoting
or market-theories, we made
other goals, name it collectivism, individualism
4 15
shareholder democracy an empty concept.
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